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Introduction
Most of the research studying international migration takes an individual level approach abstract-
ing from family ties and the household perspective. However, according to data from a representa-
tive survey among long-term emigrants from Denmark (Poutvaara, Munk, and Junge, 2009) 33%
of respondents stated to have migrated mainly for family reasons. Among all respondents this is
the second largest fraction after own work as a migration motive with 37%. In particular, among
female migrants the share of individuals stating that the family was the main reason to migrate is
large, with 47%. The importance of family ties for migration decisions has been pointed out early
in the literature (Mincer, 1978; Stark, 1985).
There is little evidence, though, on the role of family considerations in the context of international
migration. Most of the existing empirical work analyzing migration of families is restricted to
within country migration (e.g. Costa and Kahn, 2000; Nivalainen, 2004; Tenn, 2010; Rabe, 2011).
One reason for this is a lack of data on family ties of international migrants. On top of this, the
understanding of mechanisms which determine household migration decisions in the international
context is still incomplete. To this end, micro level analysis that takes a more comprehensive
household perspective not only helps to better understand the complex nature of individual mi-
gration decisions. It eventually provides insights related to migration flows on the macro level and
can establish a basis for policy design also taking into account this perspective. This dissertation
contributes both theoretically as well as empirically to this goal. The presented work provides
new insights on the role of family considerations for emigration and return decisions of migrants.
It studies how partners’ motivations, preferences and eventual decisions to migrate are related to
individual and family characteristics as well as labor market outcomes in the context of interna-
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tional migration.
Previous research has already shown that family ties are an important impediment to migration
within national borders. Mincer (1978) finds low migration rates of individuals with family ties,
in particular if both partners are employed. Families are most likely to jointly relocate if the
wife has weak labor market attachment or low earnings. Thus, family migration often reflects
incentives and gains of one partner while the other one is a tied mover. In dual career households
the co-location problem can be expected to be most severe and joint migration might go along
with one partner sacrificing his or her job opportunities, and becoming a tied mover. In the light
of increasing female labor force participation in many countries there is an extensive literature
looking at the relationship between female labor market outcomes and family migration decisions.
Costa and Kahn (2000) show that couples in which both partners hold a college degree tend to
reside in large metropolitan areas to reduce their co-location problems. On the other hand, Tenn
(2010) finds that female education and earnings are still a weak determinant for overall migration
flows of couples and families in the US. He suspects that it is too difficult to balance two careers
for a couple and concludes that women are in the weaker position when it comes to joint labor
market decisions. Gemici (2011) also argues that family migration inside the US is primarily a
response to male labor market options. Gemici finds that the correlation of married partners’
earnings gains between locations is low. Despite increasing female labor force participation these
more recent empirical evidence confirm older studies for migration within the US finding significant
over-qualification of women after family relocations (Frank, 1978) and low labor force participation
rates of married women after migration (Lichter, 1980). Confirming empirical evidence on family
migration within the US, Smits et al. (2003) find that for family relocations in the Netherlands
between 1977 and 1996 females are persistently tied movers, too.
Potentially conflicting preferences on migration can be expected to be even more important for
international migration: Partners do not necessarily share the same language skills, and different
types of education vary in the extent to which they are internationally transferable. However, little
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is known on how actual preferences towards migration are related to individual labor market char-
acteristics of the partners and how couples decide on emigration given that preferences towards
migration might not be the same. There are very few previous studies on international family
migration outside the developing country context. Borjas and Bronars (1991) and Cobb-Clark
(1993) compared family migrants to the United States with single migrants. Junge et al. (2014)
analyze self-selection of singles and self-selection of couples from Denmark, showing that primary
earners in dual-earner couples are more strongly self-selected with respect to income than singles.
This novel result counters the intuition that family ties weaken self-selection. Nonetheless, none
of these papers has information on the partners’ preferences.
The first chapter of this dissertation aims at closing this knowledge gap. It analyzes labor force
participation and household economies of emigrant couples in the light of their individual mo-
tivations to emigrate and their preferences towards the division of labor in the household. The
empirical analysis uses survey data on Danish couples that have emigrated together. Nordic coun-
tries have exceptionally small gender differences in labor force participation. Migration outside the
Nordic countries is in most cases associated with reduced female labor force participation among
couples. Answers to the respondents’ main motivation to emigrate show that the own job was
most important for males while family reasons were the dominant motive to emigrate among fe-
male partners. Female labor force participation is particularly low among mothers. In most cases,
actual labor force participation is in line with the partners’ preferred division of labor. Among
couples migrating outside the Nordic countries, 33% prefer that only the male works outside the
household and migration is associated with a 23% drop in female labor force participation. Among
couples migrating to one of the other Nordic countries, the dual-earner model dominates. The
empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction from a household labor supply model which
rationalizes reduced female labor supply with high prices and lower availability of daycare services,
like in many non-Nordic countries.
The second chapter analyzes the decision-making process on joint migration in a family. Its theo-
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retical part builds on previous work by Junge et al. (2014) relating migration decisions to earnings
of the partners among dual career couples. This chapter extends the unitary theoretical framework
on migration decisions to a bargaining model addressing the fact that partners might have con-
flicting preferences to emigrate given their individual job opportunities at home and abroad. The
chapter develops a decision-making model in which the migration decision and the redistribution of
family income depend on both partners’ threat points and their outside options. In case partners
do not reach an agreement on joint emigration, they can split up and one partner migrates alone.
The model yields novel insights for the case in which one partner sacrifices job opportunities to
stay with the family. The hypotheses derived from the model are tested empirically using survey
data on the preferences of partners who emigrated from Denmark. In line with theory, it can
be shown that higher earnings of the male partner are associated with stronger male preferences
towards joint emigration, indicating that the female partner is a tied mover. Among dual-earner
couples, lower female earnings go along with stronger male migration preferences, also agreeing
with the hypotheses derived from theory.
The third chapter studies return migration decisions of immigrant families and investigates, in
particular, the role of children in this context. The empirical analysis uses administrative data
from Denmark to analyze the determinants of return migration propensities of married or cohab-
iting immigrant partners from the same country of origin in Denmark. First, it exploits exogenous
variation in the gender of the children born abroad to identify a causal effect on return migration
of families. The analysis identifies a differential impact of the presence of daughters compared to
sons on return probabilities among Turkish immigrant families in Denmark. Having a girl as first
born child statistically significantly increases return propensities of families compared to having
a son as first born child. Still migration propensities are lower than for couples without children.
The chapter also investigates potential channels which might have an impact on return decisions of
couples with children. Families are significantly more likely to return when their oldest child was
born abroad and is below school age. Moreover, couples from countries where average schooling
quality is better are more likely to return. Additionally, the effect of an immigration policy reform
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in Denmark is studied which tightened family reunification rules for foreigners in 2002. Results
indicate that return propensities for couples from non-Western countries increase after the reform.
The increase being statistically significant only for couples with children indicates that marriage
considerations for the children might play a role in this context. Furthermore, the chapter studies
selection into return migration on primary earners’ income among couples with different family
characteristics. Primary earner incomes of those returning to the home country are higher than
among those who stay in Denmark, in particular for immigrant couples from non-Western coun-
tries. This selection pattern is weaker among dual-earner couples and families with children.
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Chapter 1
International Family Migration and the
Dual-Earner Model∗
1.1 Introduction
A couple considering migration might face a difficult trade-off in whose career to prioritize. An
important question from a societal perspective is hence whether post-migration changes in labor
force participation and and intra-household resource allocation reflect both partners’ preferences,
or whether migration hurts one of the partners. Previous research on internal migration has found
that couple migration is typically associated with career gains for men, with women often leaving
the labor market, or at least reducing hours worked (Mincer, 1978; Frank, 1978; Costa and Kahn,
2000; Compton and Pollak, 2007). As partners may differ in the international transferability of
their education and in their language skills, international migration is likely to impose even more
difficult trade-offs. This is of increasing importance in globalized economies, affecting both inter-
national allocation of talent and firm competitiveness. However, so far there is no research linking
pre-migration and post-migration outcomes in the context of international family migration.
This chapter presents first a theoretical model on how couples with and without children decide on
their labor supply. Depending on wage rates, gender identity and, in the presence of children, the
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Martin D. Munk and Panu Poutvaara.
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price of child care, couples may prefer either a dual-earner model in which both partners work out-
side the home, or a male breadwinner model in which only the male works outside the home. We
then use the predictions of the model to guide our empirical analysis on labor force participation
among emigrant couples in different destinations. We use a unique representative survey of Danish
emigrants to study why couples emigrated, to what extent emigration was a shared preference,
and how labor force participation and household economies abroad differ from the pre-migration
situation.1 The survey data is combined with the full Danish population administrative data to
evaluate to what extent our survey respondents are representative of the underlying population.
Denmark has higher female labor force participation rates than most other European countries
(75.0%, OECD, 2015) and is seen as a pioneer in gender equality (Klugman, 2011). This makes
analyzing Denmark particularly interesting when it comes to international family migration. The
patterns among Danish emigrants give insights on what to expect also among emigrants from
other developed countries, which are experiencing increasing female labor force participation rates.
Goldin (2006) called women’s increased labor force participation "the most significant change in
labor markets during the past century." Nordic countries have pioneered this change. Increased
female labor force participation has been promoted by generously subsidized child care services,
but also by heavy income taxation at the individual level, pushing families to adopt a dual-earner
model to make the ends meet. Our results shed light on whether couples emigrating from egalitar-
ian Nordic countries pursue the dual-earner model abroad, or if international mobility is associated
with adopting a traditional male breadwinner model. It could be the case that women who migrate
with their partner are not able to find a job matching their qualifications, suffering a loss as tied
movers. On the other hand, there could be Tiebout sorting, with partners preferring a traditional
male breadwinner model self-selecting into countries with lower female labor force participation
rates. Although the observable labor market outcomes of the two scenarios can be identical, namely
the male working and the female being outside the labor force, the welfare implications of changes
in labor force participation depend crucially on whether this is in line with the partners’ preferences.
1Analysis of household economies refers to whether or not both partners pool their resources and, in case of joint
household economies, to each partner’s relative contribution to the household economy.
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In order to analyze labor market participation of emigrant couples, we develop a model in which
partners jointly choose the optimal allocation of available time for labor supply and household
production. If the couple has children, the partners decide whether to buy required child care
from the market, or provide it within the household. The model allows both a gender neutral
set-up and the possibility of gendered specialization in the household as a preference for the male
breadwinner model could result from gender identity norms. For example, Bertrand et al. (2015)
conclude that a large fraction of American couples is averse to a situation in which the female earns
more than the male. The model’s comparative statics allow us to gain insights on the determinants
of how time is divided between market work and household production.
Our model predicts that the likelihood that the secondary earner works is decreasing in the sec-
ondary earner’s relative wage. A revealed preference argumentation suggests that a partner whose
job was the main reason for the couple to emigrate must gain, which in turn implies that the labor
force participation of the tied mover (who can be generally expected to be the secondary earner)
is likely to decrease. Furthermore, having children, especially young children, can be expected
to reduce female labor force participation, at least outside the Nordic countries. In the Nordic
countries, the effect can be expected to be small or even absent, due to heavily subsidized public
child care. Finally, the model suggests that labor force participation rates of women who are
tied movers are linked to income differences in various destination countries. Both small income
differences and generous child care services in other Nordic countries suggest that female labor
force participation there should be highest, being in line with the rates in Denmark. Female labor
force participation rates among Danish emigrants are expected to be lower in the United States
than in other Western countries, due to wider income differences in the United States, the same
holding among emigrants going to non-Western destinations. As female labor force participation
rates in the United States are higher than in most non-Nordic Western European countries, and
in line with Australia, Canada and New Zealand while income differences are larger in the United
States than in those countries, our model generates a testable prediction against an alternative
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hypothesis that female emigrants’ labor force participation rates would converge to female labor
force participation rates in the destination country.
While most of migration research has focused on migration from poor to rich countries, migration
flows between rich countries are also substantial. In 2013, 22 million persons born in one of the
EU15 countries2 live outside their country of origin. Of them, 42% live in another EU15 country
and an additional 13% in the United States (United Nations, 2013). The pattern of emigration
from Denmark is rather similar. In 2013, over a quarter million Danes lived outside Denmark
(corresponding to about 5% of the Danish-born population), with 50% of the migrants living in
other EU15 countries and 13% in the United States (United Nations, Department of Economic
and Social Affairs 2013). Emigration rates from Denmark are neither exceptionally low nor excep-
tionally high compared to other European countries. In 2012, the emigration rate was in the age
group 25 to 54 among the native-born 0.33% in Denmark, 0.18% in Germany, 1.19% in Ireland,
0.37% in the Netherlands, 0.13% in Spain, and 0.29% in Sweden (Eurostat 2016).
We make three main contributions to the previous literature on couple migration. First, we obtain
direct evidence on partners’ stated motivations to migrate and on whether migration was a joint
preference, or if one partner was a tied mover who would have preferred not to migrate. Second,
we have collected data on labor force participation and household economies before and after mi-
gration. Third, we analyze international migration. Due to data restrictions, almost all literature
on family migration has focused on internal migration. The few papers that have analyzed in-
ternational migration in the family context have looked at labor force participation or earnings
only in the destination (Borjas and Bronars 1991; Cobb-Clark 1993), or only in the country of
origin (Junge et al. 2014).3 Junge et al. (2014) show that the likelihood that a dual-earner couple
emigrates increases strongly in the earnings of the primary earner. Our main focus is not on the
self-selection into emigration, but on partners’ motivations to emigrate and preferred and actual
2This country group includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3There is an extensive literature on the effects of temporary migration of family members on those left behind
in the home country for example through remittances. For a survey see Docquier and Rapoport (2006)
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labor force participation patterns abroad.
We analyze couples that migrated together between 1987 and 2002, stayed together after migration
and had not returned to Denmark by the time of the survey in 2008. We find that most male
respondents migrated for own work reasons and most females for family reasons. Changes in labor
force participation after emigration are in line with stated main motivations. Female labor force
participation declined from 86.2% in Denmark to 68.0% abroad in 2008. Male labor force partici-
pation, instead, increased from 94.8% to 97.5%. Migration was almost always a shared preference:
6.4% of women and only 0.6% of men are reluctant tied movers in the sense that they would have
preferred to stay in Denmark, but migrated due to their partner’s superior job opportunities.
There are four potential explanations for lower female labor force participation rates outside Nordic
countries: wider wage differences, relatively higher price of child care services than in Denmark,
assimilation of emigrants towards prevailing social norms in the destination country, and self-
selection of couples in terms of their preference towards male breadwinner model. Empirical
analysis confirms that female labor force participation is lower among couples living in countries
where incomes are more dispersed, as measured by the GINI coefficient, as well as in countries
with less affordable child care. Prevailing female labor force participation rates in the countries
of residence, instead, fail to explain the observed differences in female labor force participation
among the migrant couples. Our survey also provides tentative evidence supporting self-selection
in terms of labor force participation preferences: a sizable minority of women viewed less stressful
working life as an argument in favor of emigrating, and a much smaller group against, while the
opposite holds among men migrating outside Nordic countries. Furthermore, considerations in
favor of children were viewed as an argument in favor of emigration clearly more often by those
migrating outside Nordic countries than by those migrating to other Nordic countries.
Our findings raise intriguing questions about family preferences towards the dual-earner and the
male breadwinner model, also outside the context of migration. One third of couples that have
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emigrated outside the Nordic countries prefer that only the male works, in a stark contrast to the
Nordic countries in which only one in sixteen couples prefers that the male works and the female
stays at home. Nonetheless, there are no pre-migration differences in female labor participation
between couples that subsequently migrated to other Nordic countries and those migrating else-
where. Furthermore, especially women migrating to the United States and non-Western countries
viewed escaping stressful working life as an argument in favor of emigration, and very few against.
This suggests that a large fraction of couples emigrating outside the Nordic countries preferred
to switch from a dual-earner model to a male breadwinner model. Those preferring a dual-earner
model might choose to stay in Denmark or to go to another Nordic country in which generous
welfare services, especially child care provision, make combining work and family easy, in order
to avoid the female being pushed out of the labor force. Tiebout (1956) already suggests that
different policy preferences play a role in the decision where to live. As it is unlikely that all
couples preferring a male breadwinner model would go as far as to emigrate, an open question is
how many of the dual-earner couples living in egalitarian Nordic countries would actually prefer
the traditional male breadwinner model, if wider income differences would allow a high living stan-
dard with only one partner working. The big differences in labor force participation and household
economies between emigrant couples in different destinations are likely to reflect a joint effect of
self-selection and labor supply adjustments as a reaction to different relative wage rates and price
and availability of child care services. However, addressing self-selection based on revealed pre-
migration preferences we do not find big differences in female labor supply in Denmark between
couples subsequently migrating to different destinations.
Some studies, e.g. Antecol (2000), Fernández and Fogli (2009) and Blau et al. (2011), conclude
that cultural background plays a major role for migrant families’ labor supply decisions in the des-
tination country. In particular, female labor force participation tends to be higher among families
coming from countries with historically stronger female labor force attachment. Our analysis in-
dicates that female labor force participation rates among emigrant couples from the same cultural
background differ substantially according to the country of residence. Our findings underline the
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importance of institutions and prices in this context. We do not find evidence that female labor
force participation rates converge to the rates prevailing in the country of residence.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model from which
we derive hypotheses to be tested in our empirical analysis. We describe our data in section 3
and summarize stylized facts in section 4. Section 5 presents our econometric analysis. Section 6
concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Various considerations might play a role when partners decide on their labor supply after having
migrated to a foreign country. We assume that families divide working time between labor market
activity and the production of a household public good in a simple unitary household economy as
proposed by Becker (1974, 1991). According to such a framework, the specialization in household
or labor market work arises due to either partner’s comparative advantage. However, gender iden-
tity might have a large impact on the division of labor in the household as well (John and Shelton,
1996, Bertrand et al. 2015; for a survey see Bertrand, 2011).
We consider a household consisting of two adult partners (and possibly children who do not make
any decisions). The time available for work and household production is equal to one for each
partner. We write the couple’s utility in the Cobb-Douglas form with 0 < α < 1 being the weight
of market good consumption c and 1− α being the weight of household production. The partners
take their decision on how much time to spend on household production Ha, Hb and how much
time to spend on working in the labor market (1−Ha), (1−Hb) in a unitary framework, i.e. they
maximize joint household utility.4 Couples with children additionally enjoy utility ψ, but have to
provide child care D̄ ≤ 1 for the children. They can choose how much of the required child care
4Alternatively, collective models recognize that household members have their own preferences, and engage in
bargaining. This approach was pioneered by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988). Our analytical
results could be derived also from a collective model, at the cost of more complex notation. The relationship between
our model and the richer collective model is discussed at the end of this section. See Browning et al. (2014) for an
overview on the unitary, cooperative and non-cooperative models of the family.
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to buy on the market (D, D ≤ D̄) and how much to provide privately (D̄ −D). The time spent
on child care is not available for other household production. For couples without children ψ = 0,
D̄ = 0 and thus D = 0. The presence of children is given exogenously as we do not focus on
fertility decisions in this analysis. Wage rates are wa for partner a and wb for partner b. Child
care can be bought for pD per time unit. We write household utility as
U = Cα(Ha +Hb − D̄ +D)1−α + ψ − λI(Ha > 0 ∧Hb < 1)
with
C = (1−Ha)wa + (1−Hb)wb − pDD.
If the household does not have a preference for partner a specializing in the work on the labor
market and b specializing in household production, independently of who earns more, then λ = 0.
In this case the partner with the higher wage specializes in labor market work and the partner
with the lower wage in household production. The model allows for the case in which partners may
have a preference towards certain family model independent of the partners’ earnings potentials
reflecting gender identity norms as shown in Akerlof and Kranton (2000). If λ >> 0, then partner
a will always specialize in the labor market and b in household production, reflecting gender role
behavior. If partner a is male and partner b is female, this can be interpreted as a preference for
a traditional male breadwinner model, giving priority to male labor market opportunities even if
wa < wb as long as λ is sufficiently large. In the following analysis we consider the case in which
wa ≥ wb and it is always optimal for a to specialize in working in the labor market. If λ = 0 or
sufficiently small restricting the analysis to wa ≥ wb is without loss of generality, as the results
would hold by reversing indices if wb > wa.
In case wa < wb but λ >> 0 specialization patterns in the household are similar as with wa ≥ wb
and λ = 0. Comparative statics results would be qualitatively similar which means that they are
not affected by a gendered role model in the family. The solution of the model for wa < wb while
λ >> 0 is provided in the appendix.
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We separately analyze household utility maximization under two mutually exclusive conditions.
First, if wb < pD, the full amount of required child care D̄ is produced privately. Second, if wb ≥ pD
all child care D = D̄ is bought on the market. For couples without children child care does not
enter in the labor supply decision as D̄ = D = 0. In both cases we proceed similarly to obtain
the utility maximizing time allocation of a and b within the household. Solving the model for
optimal time allocation of partners a and b always yields at least one corner solution for either H∗a
or H∗b . It depends on the parameter values whether the model yields an interior solution for one
partner or whether both partners fully specialize in different activities. In case there is an interior
solution one partner divides time between working in the labor market and in the household while
the other partner fully specializes in one of the two activities. If there is no interior solution to the
utility maximization problem, both partners fully specialize working either in the labor market or
in household production.
Below we present the parameter values that have to hold for each of these solutions (0 < H∗a ≤
1, H∗b = 1), (H∗a = 0, H∗b = 1) or (H∗a = 0, 0 ≤ H∗b < 1). The appendix provides a consistency
check that the presented time allocations and labor supply decisions yield indeed optimal household
utility levels.
In case wb < pD

H∗1a = 1− 2α + αD̄,H∗1b = 1 if α < 12−D̄
H∗1a = 0, H∗1b = 1 if 12−D̄ ≤ α ≤
wa
wa+wb−wbD̄
H∗1a = 0, H∗1b = (1− α)
(
wa
wb
+ 1
)
+ αD̄ if wa
wa+wb−wbD̄
< α.
In case wb ≥ pD

H∗2a = 1− 2α− (1− α)pDwa D̄,H
∗2
b = 1 if α < wa−pDD̄2wa−pDD̄
H∗2a = 0, H∗2b = 1 if wa−pDD̄2wa−pDD̄ ≤ α ≤
wa−pDD̄
wa+wb−pDD̄
H∗2a = 0, H∗2b = (1− α)
(
wa
wb
+ 1− pD
wb
D̄
)
if wa−pDD̄
wa+wb−pDD̄
< α.
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As can be seen from H∗1b and H∗2b , individual labor supply of partner b increases along the intensive
margin with wb and decreases with wa. Additionally, the labor market participation threshold for
b in terms of the couple’s utility weight for consumption α decreases with wb and increases with wa.
For couples with children, the threshold for which b’s labor supply equals zero also depends on
the amount of required child care D̄. Among parents providing D = D̄ of own time for child care
(wb < pD), the participation threshold value increases with D̄. Less time is available for household
production generating relatively high marginal utility and the minimum relative wage for b to
participate in the labor market increases. In families buying D = D̄ on the market (wb ≥ pD), the
threshold for labor market participation of b decreases with D̄. The relative wage of b needed for
labor market participation is lower if required child care increases because financing more expenses
for child care makes additional labor supply necessary. These results also hold for the case that
wa < wb while λ >> 0 (Appendix). Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between the minimum
relative wage for labor market participation of b and the required time D̄ for different values of
α. The values on the vertical axis (D̄ = 0) reveal the required relative wage for b to participate in
the labor force if the couple has no children.
Figure 1.1: Required child care and min. relative wage for labor force participation of partner b.
The theory presents a mechanism relating each partner’s earnings potential and required child care
to labor supply decisions in the household. The decision on which of the partners specializes in
the labor market could either be due to comparative advantage (λ = 0) or due to preferences for
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partner b to specialize in household production (λ >> 0). In the data we observe that almost
all male partners work full-time before as well as after migration. Female labor supply and labor
market participation vary to a larger extent. Given our data the subsequent analysis is going to
study the implications of the model for the case that households adjust female labor supply and
the male partner works full time on the labor market. Hence, we refer to partner a as the male
and partner b as the female partner.
This chapter focuses on household economies and labor supply decisions in the context of inter-
national migration. Migration goes along with changes in employment and the partners’ income
situation. In the light of our theoretical model, we relate potential explanatory factors like the
partners’ education - as an indicator for their earnings potential - as well as family characteristics
to household economies and labor supply abroad.
We can summarize the hypotheses we test as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (tied mover effect). Female labor force participation is lower abroad if the female
partner is a tied mover.
Hypothesis 1 follows as if a couple migrates mainly for job opportunities of one partner, we expect
by the revealed preference argumentation that the wage rate of that partner increases. This, in
turn, makes it likely that the other partner works less, even if the wage rate of the other partner
would be the same abroad. If the wage rate of the accompanying spouse is lower abroad, this
further reduces his or her expected labor force participation.
Hypothesis 2 (the effects of children). Having children, especially young children, reduces female
labor force participation in countries with expensive child care services.
Hypothesis 2 follows from our model if the female partner is more often the one taking care of chil-
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dren at home, and child care costs in Denmark and other Nordic countries are heavily subsidized,
while child care is rather expensive elsewhere. This suggests that having children reduces female
labor force participation more strongly outside the Nordic countries. Figure 1.1 illustrates that
the relative wage required for female labor force participation is higher if child care is provided by
the female partner in the household.
Hypothesis 3 (cross-country differences). Female labor force participation rate is lower in countries
with wider income differences.
According to our model, labor force participation rate of secondary earners (partner b) is decreas-
ing in the wage rate of the primary earners (partner a). We present the hypothesis in terms of
what to expect from female tied movers, as our subsequent empirical analysis has too few ob-
servations of male tied movers to test the hypothesis for them. The cross-country differences in
expected female labor force participation rates follow from combining the theoretical prediction of
Hypothesis 1 with the previous empirical results on income differences between different countries
and self-selection of emigrants.
Although Denmark has one of the highest female labor force participation rates, females more often
work part-time compared to males (OECD 2015). In addition, in terms of hourly wages the OECD
still reports an unconditional gender pay gap for Denmark of 11.8% in 2010.5 Thus, already before
emigration in most couples the male partner earned more than the female and this gap is likely
to increase abroad, in particular in destination countries with wider income differences. Income
differences in the United States and non-Western countries are larger than income differences in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Western Europe; see Grogger and Hanson (2010) and Klug-
man (2011).
Borjas (1987) argues that emigrants from a country with a relatively narrow income distribution
5The unconditional gender pay gap is not to be interpreted as evidence for discrimination of women. It is the
joint effect of differences in qualifications, career choices and any remaining discrimination. Time allocation which
maximizes family resources for consumption depends on the unconditional pay gap.
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like Denmark are selected from the upper end of that distribution because they are more likely to
gain abroad compared to those at the lower end. Borjas et al. (2015) show that Danes emigrat-
ing to other Nordic countries are not as strongly self-selected in terms of their earnings as Danes
emigrating to the rest of the world. In the family context, Junge et al. (2014) find that emigrant
couples from Denmark are strongly positively selected on the primary earner’s income. They show
that self-selection into migration of couples is more responsive to the primary earner’s income and
less responsive to the secondary earner’s income than the self-selection of singles with respect to
their income.
An increase in earnings differentials between the partners in the country of residence might make
it optimal to switch from a dual-earner to a single-earner model. Therefore, we expect labor force
participation of tied movers to be highest in Nordic countries and lowest in the United States
and non-Western countries, with other Western countries having rates in between. A compet-
ing hypothesis could be that couples with a certain preference for division of labor, irrespective
of economic incentives, self-select into particular destinations. A further alternative hypothesis
unrelated to our model would link differences in female labor force participation among Danish
emigrant women in different countries to differences in average female labor force participation in
those countries. We compare predictions arising from our model with these alternative hypotheses
in section 5.
Moreover, couples with children might not be able to find suitable and affordable child care op-
portunities abroad. If a couple has to take care of its children at home, the parent doing so,
typically the mother, has less time available in the labor market. The threshold for female labor
force participation increases and the female partner is more likely not to work. On the other
hand, if child care is bought on the market the female is more likely to work. According to the
theory the decision whether or not to purchase child care services depends on its relative price. In
Denmark and other Nordic countries, child care services are heavily subsidized and comparatively
cheap. This allows both partners to combine work and family. In many other countries, child care
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is less easily available and more costly than in Denmark.6 Our prior is that female labor force
participation decreases abroad if the couple has children, in particular for couples children below
school age, and that this relationship is less strong for the Nordic countries.
Although we presented our model in a unitary framework, it would be straightforward to extend
it to a collective framework. Instead of maximizing household utility function, we would write the
two partners’ utility functions separately. When the household resource allocation is Pareto effi-
cient, the bargaining outcome is as if the household would maximize the sum of the two partners’
utility functions, weighted to reflect their relative bargaining power (Chiappori 1988; Apps and
Rees 1988). Cherchye et al. (2012) extended the model to account for more than one domestic
good (like parental time and household activities like cleaning), and brought the model to data.
We use the simpler unitary model as our data does not allow testing the richer collective model.
As Cherchye et al. (2012), we separate between time spent on child care and other household
production, but our setting is simpler as we take the time required for child care as exogenous
and do not model leisure choice. Instead, we allow child care to be produced either inside the
household, or bought from the market, and show that the effects of time required for child care
on female labor supply depend crucially on whether the child care cost is more or less than the
female wage rate. As a result, female labor force participation is expected to be much lower among
couples requiring child care in countries with more expensive child care, but not in the Nordic
countries where public day care centers are available and affordable for most parents.
1.3 Data
We study household migration using own survey data on Danes who had emigrated in 1987, 1988,
1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2001 or 2002, and had not returned to Denmark by 2007. The survey was
6Previous literature has shown that the quality, availability and affordability of child care services has a consid-
erable impact on couples’ labor supply decisions. For example, Berger and Black (1992) show that receiving child
care subsidies increased employment of mothers in the US. In general, public child care is more easily available
and more heavily subsidized in the Nordic countries than in most other countries. This makes it easier and more
attractive for both partners to participate in the labor market when having children.
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planned by Munk and Poutvaara within the project "Danes Abroad: Economic and Social Mo-
tivations for Emigration and Return Migration", financed by the Danish Social Science Research
Council. The survey was carried out by Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark used the full population register to identify all Danish citizens who had em-
igrated, and had not returned by the end of 2007. Emigrants had to be aged 18 or more when
they emigrated, and at most 59 in 2007. These restrictions yield a population of 17,309 emi-
grants during the selected years. For 55% of those emigrants Statistics Denmark found contact
information on relatives living in Denmark. They were asked to provide address, telephone num-
ber and email address of the person abroad. Statistics Denmark then tried to contact the target
persons using this information. The link to the web-based questionnaire could finally be sent
out by email to 6,984 emigrants with validated email addresses. When data collection was closed
in August 2008 4,257 persons had answered the survey. This makes an overall response rate of 61%.
We can link respondents with the population register data using a unique personal identifier, the
social security number. Like other Nordic countries, Denmark collects comprehensive data on
residence, wages, tax payments, education and household composition for every individual in the
country. Having a social security number is compulsory and necessary for everyday life activities,
like visiting a doctor, enrolling at school or opening a bank account. Our main data sources are
the individual administrative register and the migration register containing information on age,
gender, date of emigration and destination and eventual return migration, educational attainment
and household composition in Denmark.
Our survey data contains information on several characteristics like education, household compo-
sition and work situation for the respondent and his or her partner before migration in Denmark
as well as in 2008 abroad. Survey respondents were also asked about their main motivation to em-
igrate and their preferences for their own and for their partner’s labor force participation. On top
of this, they were asked to provide information about their household economies before migration
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in Denmark and in 2008 abroad.
This analysis focuses on long-term emigration of couples and we consider only partners who stayed
together abroad at least until 2008.7 We restrict the sample to individuals who emigrated with their
partner and whose partner is a Danish citizen, born in Denmark. The reason for this restriction
is that in international couples, emigration from Denmark might imply returning to the home
country of one partner, making a migration decision qualitatively different. Our analysis revealed
that results on the subsample of respondents with a foreign partner are qualitatively similar but
statistically weaker and thus will not be reported here. We furthermore require that the partners
lived together in Denmark. In our survey 632 respondents fulfill the above restrictions. Using
migration events from the administrative registers we are able to construct the population of
individuals who emigrated with their partner during the same years as those considered for the
survey. Using the register data restricts attention to joint emigrations where partners migrated to
the same destination country in the same year. This is more restrictive than our survey sample
as it does not include sequential migrations. However, we cannot distinguish between sequential
emigration and split-ups using only the administrative data. The register data yields an overall
sample of 1250 couples in which partners were at least 18 when emigrating and at most 59 in
2007, who emigrated jointly and did not return until 2008. As in the survey, both partners are
Danes, born in Denmark. The descriptive statistics for migrations according to register data and
our survey are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1. For the sample of survey respondents
which are going to be analyzed in the remainder of this chapter attention is restricted to partners
who reported to have emigrated together and who still live together abroad in 2008, which yields
a sample of 522 respondents referred to in column 3. Table 1 shows the distribution of initial
destinations and emigration years for the three samples. Furthermore, it reports female labor
force participation rates in Denmark before migration.
Data indicates that a slightly lower share of survey respondents emigrated in 1987/88 compared
with the register data emigrations. Overall, the shares of migrant couples having emigrated in
7Both married and cohabiting couples are included. Cohabitation before or instead of marriage is a common
phenomenon in the Scandinavian countries (Kiernan, 2004).
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Registered Survey respondents Survey respondents,
joint couple migrations, joint emigration, joint emigration,
no return no return live together abroad
Nordic countries 25.8 23.4 21.8
United Kingdom 10.6 13.1 14.2
Rest of Western Europe 29.7 30.2 30.5
United States 11.0 14.1 14.0
AUS, CAN, NZ 7.7 5.1 5.0
Non-Western countries 15.2 14.1 14.6
1987/88 13.3 9.7 8.2
1992/93 11.8 14.6 13.2
1997/98 23.4 30.2 30.5
2001/02 51.5 45.5 48.1
Female LFP rate in DK 84.5 83.7 86.2
Male LFP rate in DK 92.1 90.8 94.8
Observations 1,250 632 522
Source: Survey and register data
Notes: LFP: Labor force participation. Initial destination countries and emigration
years reported. Joint emigration according to the register data requires that both
partners are Danish nationals, born in Denmark, at least 18 when emigrating and at
most 60 in 2008 and emigrated in the same year to the same destination and did not
return until 2008. According to survey data both partners are Danish nationals, born
in Denmark, the respondent is at least 18 when emigrating and at most 60 in 2008
and reported to have migrated together with the partner.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics. Joint emigrations of couples in register data and survey.
the different year-pairs do not vary substantially between the three columns. The same holds for
migration to different destination countries and for labor force participation rates before migration.
Female labor force participation before migration is high as typical for Denmark: Depending on
the sample, 83.7% to 86.2% of female partners are in the labor force before emigration which is
almost as high as the corresponding number for males with 90.8% to 94.8%.
Using an identifier for cohabiting or married partners from the population register data we are
able to link respondents to their partners in the administrative data. We can identify 60 couples
in which both partners answered the survey. The remaining analysis is based on 522 respondents
as well as their partners who satisfy the restrictions above and live together in 2008. In the whole
analysis, couples having migrated to Greenland or Faroe Islands are excluded because these are
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autonomous regions of Denmark. Respondents were asked whether they were married or in a
registered partnership or cohabiting. We did not find any same-gender partnerships among our re-
spondents in the register data. Therefore subsequent analysis refers to partners as male and female.
Male respondents Female respondents All respondents
Low power couples 16.3 16.6 16.5
Female power couples 8.6 11.9 10.2
Male power couples 21.2 17.4 19.4
Power couples 53.9 54.2 54.0
Nordic countries 17.5 24.5 20.9
United Kingdom 12.6 13.4 13.0
Rest of Western Europe 32.7 30.8 31.8
United States 15.6 16.6 16.1
AUS, CAN, NZ 7.4 3.6 5.6
Non-Western countries 14.1 11.1 12.6
No children in 2008 20.5 23.3 21.8
Youngest child 0-6 in 2008 33.5 32.4 33.0
Youngest child 7+ in 2008 46.0 44.3 45.2
Female LFP in 2008 69.1 66.8 68.0
Male LFP in 2008 98.9 96.1 97.5
Observations 269 253 522
Source: Survey data
Notes: Current country of residence, all characteristics reported according to survey
data in 2008.
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics for respondents having migrated with current partner.
The composition of our sample with respect to various characteristics is reported in Table 2.1.
Following Costa and Kahn (2000) we distinguish different "power" types of couples reflecting the
partners’ levels of education. In power couples both partners have at least college education. In
male and female power couples, only one partner holds a college degree and in low power cou-
ples neither partner has completed college education.8 With 54.0%, power couples are the biggest
group among the respondents while there are 19.4% male power couples and only 10.2% female
power couples. The fraction of 25 to 64 year olds in the Danish population with at least medium
8We define college degree as having at least medium tertiary eduction; however, our results are robust to using
university bachelor’s degree as cutoff.
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tertiary education was 24% in 2008 (Statistics Denmark 2009). Thus compared with the overall
Danish population the average level of education among our respondents is high. This is in line
with results from Borjas, Kauppinen and Poutvaara (2015) who find that emigrants from Denmark
are strongly positively self-selected according to their pre-migration education and earnings. Table
2.1 reports the country of residence of the respondents in 2008. A large fraction of the couples in
our sample (20.9%) live in one of the other Nordic countries, Sweden, Norway, Finland or Iceland.
16.1% of the couples live in the US, and 13.0% in the UK. In total 65.7% percent of the couples live
in another Western European country.9 In 2008, 78.2% of couples have children in the household,
with 33.0% of the couples having children below school age. Female labor force participation has
decreased considerably in 2008 compared to the situation in Denmark: only 68.0% of females par-
ticipate in the labor force. Male labor force participation, on the other hand, has even increased
to 97.5%. Characteristics presented in Table 2.1 do not reveal any response bias for whether the
survey respondent was male or female, with the exception that there are slightly more female than
male respondents in other Nordic destination countries. This is the only difference among the
reported characteristics which is statistically significant on the 5% level.
1.4 Big Picture
1.4.1 Main Motivation to Emigrate
Our survey provides information about the respondents’ main motivation to emigrate. Table 1.3
presents information separately for men and women who emigrated with a Danish partner and live
together abroad in 2008.10 For all residence country groups, own work was the most important
motivation to emigrate for a clear majority of men. The majority of women in all non-Nordic
9The differences in the shares of country groups between Table 2.1 and 1.1 are due to the fact that some couples
migrated from the initial destination country to another country.
10Due to small numbers of observations when reporting results separately for female and male respondents we
group together other Western destination countries apart from the US and the Nordic countries in one category.
We keep these country groups throughout the remainder of the analysis and show in the appendix that our findings
we describe later do not differ much between the destination groups Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the UK
and other Western European countries.
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countries migrated due to family reasons. Work reasons dominate especially strongly among men
and family reasons among women who live in the US and in non-Western countries. Among women
who live in other Nordic countries, about one third emigrated for work, almost one third for family
and a little more than one third for other reasons, like studies.
Other Non-
Nordic United Western Western
countries States countries countries Total
Male partners
Own work 66.0 81.0 71.1 92.1 74.7
Family 10.6 0.0 7.8 0.0 6.0
Other reasons 23.4 19.0 21.1 7.9 19.3
Female partners
Own work 33.9 11.9 20.7 14.2 21.7
Family 30.7 76.2 52.9 67.9 53.0
Other reasons 35.4 11.9 26.4 17.9 25.3
Source: Survey data
Table 1.3: Main motivations to emigrate.
Table 1.4 presents evaluations of further factors which had an impact on the decision to emigrate.
Two out of five women living outside Nordic countries viewed a less stressful working life as an
important or very important reason to emigrate, and one in ten as an argument for staying in
Denmark. Among men migrating outside other Nordic countries, a less stressful working life was
more often an argument for staying in Denmark. Both men and women living in other Nordic
countries view a less stressful working life more often an argument for emigration.
The distribution of preferences in Table 1.4 suggests, furthermore, that most parents viewed con-
siderations related to their children to be neither in favor nor against emigration, but there is
also a significant minority which saw considerations related to children as an important or very
important reason to emigrate. This is most pronounced among parents migrating to the US. Baker
et al. (2008), Havnes and Mogstad (2015) as well as Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2014) show that
universal public child care might affect child outcomes negatively.11 Del Boca et al. (2014) find
11Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2014) show that the effects of universal childcare depend strongly on the child’s age.
The negative effect is stronger when the children gain access at younger age, but turns positive for those that are 3
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that parents’ time spent with their child is important for the child’s cognitive development. One
possible explanation for our findings is that the respondents for whom considerations related to
children are a reason to emigrate prefer that the children are taken care of at home, typically by
the mother. We checked whether fertility decisions of the couples differ according to the country
of residence but we did not find any systematic difference.
Other Non-
Nordic United Western Western
countries States countries countries
Male partners
Less stressful working life in favor 25.5 14.3 21.8 15.8
against 4.3 28.6 23.2 31.6
Considerations for children in favor 6.4 26.2 16.2 23.7
(couples with children) against 2.1 2.4 3.5 0.0
Female partners
Less stressful working life in favor 19.4 42.9 36.4 46.4
against 4.8 11.9 7.4 10.7
Considerations for children in favor 11.3 31.0 19.8 14.3
(couples with children) against 4.8 2.4 1.7 0.0
Source: Survey data
Table 1.4: Selected arguments in favor or against emigration.
With our data we are additionally able to address the question which partner had stronger pref-
erences towards emigration. Respondents were asked whether both had equally strong migration
preferences or whether one of the partners was more in favor of emigration. Table 1.5 shows, that
in most cases the partners agreed on emigration and in a clear majority emigration was a joint
preference of both partners.12 In every destination country group more than 50% of the respon-
dents stated that they and their partner had equally strong preferences to emigrate. In 39.0% of
couples, the male and in 9.1% the female partner was more strongly in favor of emigration. In
years or older. Cornelissen et al. (2015) show for a universal child care program in Germany that attendance rates
are higher for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
12A potential concern in Table 1.5 might be a bias due to misreporting of the partners’ preferences depending
on the characteristics of the partner who answered the questionnaire. Using register data, we were able to identify
among our respondents 60 couples in which both the male and the female answered our survey and analyzed both
partners’ mutual assessment of migration preferences in this subsample. Table A1 shows that in 49 of 60 cases
the partners’ answers on their respective migration preferences were perfect matches. If there were deviations one
partner mostly reported mutual agreement while the other stated stronger migration preferences of the male or
female partner. Thus, we can expect joint migration preferences to be correctly assessed by one partner for most
of the remaining observations in our sample.
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particular, in the non-Nordic countries, a larger share of males had stronger emigration preferences
reflecting migration due to male job opportunities as described above. The share of stronger female
preferences towards emigration was highest among couples in the Nordic countries. If there was
disagreement concerning the emigration decision it was mostly the female partner who disagreed:
With 11.0% this share is highest among couples having emigrated to the US.
Other Non-
Nordic United Western Western
countries States countries countries Total
Equal preferences 53.2 51.2 51.9 51.5 52.0
Stronger male preference 27.5 34.2 34.4 31.8 32.6
Stronger female preference 13.8 3.7 6.9 12.1 8.5
Female against emigration 4.6 11.0 6.1 4.6 6.4
Male against emigration 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.6
Source: Survey data
Table 1.5: Partners’ agreement or disagreement on emigration.
Overall, Tables 1.3 to 1.5 show that migration was a joint preference of both partners for most
of the respondents, even though the migration motives differ: Males migrated mainly for job
opportunities while females for family reasons.
1.4.2 Actual and Preferred Labor Force Participation
Table 1.6 shows that the heterogeneity in migration motives is reflected strongly in differences in
female labor force participation at different destinations. In Denmark before migration though, the
partners’ labor force participation rates do not differ much between partners living subsequently
in different destinations.13 Overall, in only 3.4% of the couples the female partner stayed at home
while the male partner was in the labor force. There was no male partner who stayed at home
while the female was in the labor force. Abroad, we observe substantially lower female labor force
participation: In 28.2% of the couples the female partner stays at home and male partner partici-
pates in the labor force. Male labor force participation, on the other hand, even increased slightly.
13We consider a partner as being in the labor force at a given time in case of employment, self-employment or
unemployment. Couples with at least one student or retiree are reported in a separate category. There are 13.4%
of couples with at least one student or retiree before emigration. Apart from one retiree in our sample this share is
due to studies before migration.
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Male in the Female in the
Both in the labor force, labor force, At least one partner
labor force female home male home retiree or student
In Denmark 83.1 3.4 0.0 13.4
Nordic countries 78.0 4.6 0.0 17.4
Non-Nordic countries 84.5 3.2 0.0 12.4
United States 85.7 4.8 0.0 9.5
Other Western countries 84.4 2.7 0.0 12.9
Non-Western countries 83.3 3.1 0.0 13.6
Abroad in 2008 66.3 28.2 1.0 4.6
Low power couples 69.8 24.4 3.5 2.3
Female power couples 69.8 18.9 3.8 7.5
Male power couples 50.5 43.6 0.0 5.9
Power couples 70.2 25.5 0.0 4.3
Nordic countries 87.2 5.5 1.8 5.5
Non-Nordic countries 60.8 34.1 0.7 4.4
United States 48.8 47.6 0.0 3.6
Other Western countries 67.7 27.0 0.8 4.6
Non-Western countries 48.5 45.5 1.5 4.6
No children in 2008 79.8 12.3 1.8 6.1
Youngest child 0-6 in 2008 57.0 39.5 0.6 2.9
Youngest child 7+ in 2008 66.5 27.5 0.9 5.1
Source: Survey and register data
Table 1.6: Percentage shares for actual labor force participation.
Low female labor force participation abroad is most pronounced among male power couples. Most
importantly, the data reveal substantial differences in labor force participation in 2008 depend-
ing on the country of residence. Female labor force participation rates are particularly low and
decreased dramatically among couples having migrated to the US; in this group, in 47.6% of the
couples the female stays out of the labor force while the male is in the labor force. In the Nordic
countries, on the other hand, this is only the case among 5.5% of the couples. The corresponding
shares are 27.0% in other Western countries and 45.5% in the remaining countries. Appendix Ta-
ble A2 illustrates that female labor force participation between the UK, other Western European
countries and Australia, Canada and New Zealand do not differ much. A high share of dual-earner
couples in Australia, Canada and New Zealand compared with the US highlights that low female
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Male in the Female in the
Both in the labor force, labor force, Both
labor force female home male home at home No answer
All 62.1 27.6 1.1 1.7 7.5
Nordic countries 80.7 6.3 1.8 2.8 8.2
Non-Nordic countries 57.1 33.2 1.0 1.5 7.3
United States 40.5 52.4 1.2 0.0 6.0
Other Western countries 62.7 28.1 0.8 2.3 6.1
Non-Western countries 56.1 28.8 1.5 0.0 13.6
Source: Survey data
Table 1.7: Percentage shares for preferred labor force participation.
labor force participation cannot be explained by long distance migration. Table 1.6 additionally
shows that female labor force participation decreased particularly among couples with children in
the household.
Respondents were asked about their preferred division of labor in the household. In their answers
they could indicate who of the partners they prefer to participate in the labor market.14 Table 1.7
reveals that low female labor force participation in 2008 seems to reflect the respondents’ prefer-
ences towards their own and their partners’ participation in the labor market. Respondents who
reside in the US are clearly more likely to state that they prefer the male partner to work while
the female partner stays at home. In the Nordic countries, on the other hand, most respondents
prefer a dual-earner household.
In Table 1.8, we compare female labor force participation rates according to whether the female
partner was a tied mover. We derive this information from the respondents’ main motivation to
emigrate. In all country groups, except for the US, female labor force participation is lowest when
the female is a tied mover, i.e. male respondents reported that they migrated for their own job
opportunities and female respondents reported to have migrated mainly for family reasons. At the
14To alleviate the concern that respondents gave self-serving answers concerning their partner’s preferred labor
force participation we analyze responses among the 60 couples in which both the male and the female answered
our survey. The responses are in most cases mutually consistent among both partners as Table A3 shows. Given
this subsample of couples we are confident that the responses do not depend on which of the partners answered
the survey. In a clear majority of cases, the partners agreed that either both should work, or that the male should
work and female should stay at home.
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A: All couples. Nordic Other Western Non Western
countries US countries countries
Male tied mover 100.0% 40.0% 94.0% 75.0%
(26) (5) (36) (4)
No tied mover 97.0% 46.1% 75.8% 62.5%
(33) (13) (62) (8)
Female tied mover 90.0% 54.5% 65.4% 51.9%
(50) (66) (165) (54)
B: Couples without
pre-school age children.
Male tied mover 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(14) (2) (25) (1)
No tied mover 100.0% 57.1% 86.9% 80.0%
(21) (7) (46) (5)
Female tied mover 90.9% 59.1% 66.4% 66.7%
(33) (44) (116) (36)
Source: Survey data
Notes: Numbers of observation in parentheses.
Table 1.8: Female labor force participation rates and tied mover status.
same time, female labor force participation is highest among couples in which the male partner
is a tied mover. Among couples without pre-school-age children, we find that in all considered
country groups all women whose male partner is a tied mover participate in the labor force. These
findings agree with Hypothesis 1 in our model. Tied mover’s partner should gain from migration,
suggesting that wage differences abroad are larger than in Denmark. This makes it more likely
that the tied mover (typically the female partner) works less, particularly if the couple migrates
to a country where the dispersion of income is larger. This leads to lower female labor force par-
ticipation, especially in the US and non-Western countries where incomes are more dispersed, and
less so in other Nordic countries.15 Table A4 in the appendix shows that the pattern presented
for the aggregated group of other Western countries hold separately for the UK, Other Western
Europe and Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
15According to Klugman (2011) the income GINI coefficient or the income quintile ratio 2000-2011 is lowest in
Nordic countries. For the US the income inequality measures are higher than for Western Europe and Australia,
Canada and New Zealand.
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1.4.3 Household Economies
Table 1.9 provides further insights to the organization of household economies beyond the partners’
labor force participation. Respondents were asked whether they had separate economies or joint
economies before migration as well as at the time of the survey in 2008.16 In separate economies
the partners dispose of their own incomes and share only common expenses while couples with
joint economies pool at least part of their individual incomes. Table 1.9 shows the couples’ types
of household economies and provides information in case of joint household economies on which of
the partners contributes more. The survey questions were referring to the situation before migra-
tion (Panel A) and in 2008 (Panel B). We present the distribution of responses separately, again
by country of residence in 2008.
Before migration, most couples have joint household economies to which both partners contribute
labor market income. Table 1.9 also shows that a considerable fraction of couples had separate
household economies in Denmark. For 2008 we observe that the overall share of joint household
economies is considerably higher and separate economies are less frequent among the couples in
all country groups compared to the situation in Denmark. The share of household economies to
which both partners contribute equally decreases. In general, we observe more couples in which
the male partner is the main income earner. In 66.1% of cases the male partner contributed more
in Denmark; this share increased to 76.6% abroad in 2008.
There is substantial heterogeneity between household economies in different countries of residence.
The share of females who stay at home is higher in 2008 for all except the Nordic countries. There
are pronounced differences between the US and the Nordic countries. None of the couples in
16A potential concern related to our results might be that household economy dynamics are driven by a time effect
which is unrelated to migration. Moreover, the composition of emigrant cohorts might have changed over time.
Our findings could then be driven by a subgroup of households in our sample depending on the year of emigration.
Table A5 addresses these issues and alleviates our concerns: We present separately the household economies for
couples that emigrated before 1999 and in 2001/2002. We do not observe qualitative differences among the cohorts
in terms of changes in household economies. For example, the decrease in the share of separate household economies
among the 2000/2001 emigration cohorts is almost as high as for the couples that left Denmark in earlier years.
Moreover, the composition of the cohorts in terms of countries of residence does not vary substantially over the
years of emigration either as Table A6 shows.
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Other Non-
Nordic Western West.
A: Household economy in DK countr. US countr. countr. Total
Separate economies 15.6 10.7 12.9 9.1 12.6
Joint economies, male brings in more 54.1 75.0 58.9 78.8 63.0
Joint economies, female brings in more 11.0 1.2 9.1 4.6 7.7
Joint economies, equal contributions 11.9 10.7 14.4 7.6 12.5
Male brings in all money, female stays home 6.4 1.2 3.0 0.0 3.1
Female brings in all money, male stays home 0.0 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.4
No answer 0.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.8
B: Household economy in 2008
Separate economies 7.3 0.0 1.9 0.0 2.5
Joint economies, male brings in more 47.7 47.6 55.1 54.6 52.3
Joint economies, female brings in more 22.9 2.4 9.5 3.0 10.3
Joint economies, equal contributions 14.7 6.0 8.8 3.0 8.8
Male brings in all money, female stays home 5.5 44.1 22.4 37.9 24.3
Female brings in all money, male stays home 1.8 0.0 1.1 1.5 1.2
No answer 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.6
Observations 109 84 263 66 522
Source: Survey data
Table 1.9: Percentage shares of household economies before migration and in 2008.
the US has separate economies or joint economies where the female partner brings in all money.
Among 91.7% of the couples having emigrated to the US the male partner contributes the major
share to the joint household economy. This fraction has increased from 76.2% before migration for
these couples. In the Nordic countries, on the other hand, the male partner contributes most or
all income among 53.2% of couples. Compared with the situation before emigration this fraction
has even decreased. Moreover, in the Nordic countries the share of female partners who contribute
more than the male to joint household economies has more than doubled from 11.0% before mi-
gration to 24.7% in 2008. In all other country groups, this share is lower and has not changed
much when comparing the situation before emigration with 2008.
At a first glance, our findings suggest that international migration fosters asymmetries in terms of
labor market outcomes between male and female partners as many couples adopt a male breadwin-
ner model after migration. Moreover, our results show that migration reflects male job opportuni-
ties while females mainly migrate for family reasons. This is especially the case for couples having
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migrated to the US but also in other non-Nordic countries. When it comes to the other Nordic
countries, own work is a slightly more common main motivation than family for women, and the
share of men migrating for own work is somewhat lower than in other destinations (Table 1.3).
The observed patterns are also reflected by the couples’ household economies in terms of more
income pooling and higher male contributions to joint household economies. Low female labor
force participation abroad seems to reflect preferred division of labor of male and female partners,
taking into account that for the overwhelming majority of couples emigration was a shared pref-
erence for all considered destination groups.
The high level of mutual agreement and small differences between the country groups in the dis-
tribution of answers in Table 1.5 might be surprising in light of changes in household economies
and labor force participation outside the Nordic countries. Tiebout (1956) suggests that not only
income but also different policies might be an important determinant in the choice where to live.
Policy preferences which play a role for families likely relate to child care, schools and taxation
(i.e. individual tax filing or joint tax filing for couples). As shown in Table 1.7 respondents in our
sample have very different preferences for the partners’ division of labor in different countries of
residence, in line with differences in actually observed labor force participation. Before migration
in Denmark, though, female labor force participation rates and household economies in Denmark
do not differ much between couples migrating to different destinations in the future. This speaks
against an alternative hypothesis that our findings are mainly due to the self selection of couples
with a certain type of household economy into different destinations.
As discussed in the previous section, several potential channels may play a role in explaining dif-
ferences in actual and preferred labor force participation and household economies of the couples.
First of all, countries differ in their institutional environments. The differences in returns to skills
will have an effect on labor supply decisions of partners. In countries with large income differences,
like the US, the lower earning partner would be more likely to stay at home. This mechanism is
suggested by our theoretical framework. Less stressful working life being an important argument
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in favor of emigration for women suggests that other factors also play an important role in explain-
ing low labor force participation rates of females in couples having migrated outside the Nordic
countries. Moreover, the public provision of child care services provides incentives for labor market
participation of both partners. Our model predicts that a lower price of child care would incen-
tivize higher female labor force participation. Moreover, couples emigrating to a country where
the provision of child care is low might be those preferring to spend more time with their children.
In order to better understand the observed changes in labor force participation and household
economies, we are going to jointly assess the role of various individual- and family characteristics
in different countries of residence.
1.5 Econometric Analysis
Female Labor Force Participation
We use a linear probability regression framework to test the hypotheses from our theory with the
data. For the subsequent analysis we exclude couples in which the female partner is retiree or
student. In Table 2.5, we present factors associated with female labor force participation in the
country of residence in 2008. As baseline explanatory variables, we include the couple’s power type
(reference category: low power couples) and indicator variables for children in the household. We
use the GINI coefficient to capture income differences in the country of residence. This coefficient
refers to inequality in disposable incomes on the individual level taken from the WIDER WIID
database (2016) for the year 2008. In an alternative specification, we include country group dum-
mies (reference category: other Western countries) which additionally control for between country
variation in language, culture and other factors which might be related to female labor force par-
ticipation abroad. We also present separate regressions by country of residence groups.
Estimates in Table 2.5 show that the presence of children is negatively associated with female labor
force participation. This is especially the case for young children below the age of 7 which is in
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line with Hypothesis 2 from our model. The first column indicates, furthermore, that female labor
force participation is lower in countries with wider income differences, which confirms Hypothesis
3. When controlling for country groups and comparing intercepts in the separate regressions we
see that female labor force participation in the Nordic countries is more likely than in the US, other
Western countries and non-Western countries.17 Our results do not reveal any significant effect of
the presence of young children among couples having migrated to the Nordic countries while there
are strong negative effects for the other countries. Female labor force participation is particularly
low among couples with children aged 0 to 6 in the US and non-Western countries. In Table A9
we also present results including the "Starting Well Index", an index capturing the availability,
affordability and quality of child care services in a subset of countries (The Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2012). Results reveal that a higher value of this index is associated with higher female labor
force participation which also is in line with our theory. The effect of the GINI coefficient is robust
to including the "Starting Well Index".
In Table A10 we additionally include an indicator for the work status of the female in Denmark
before migration. If the female worked before migration, we estimate a significantly higher proba-
bility for actual labor force participation abroad. Still the size and significance of most coefficient
estimates remains unchanged.
Moreover, we find that actual labor force participation reflects the preferred division of labor
among the partners. In a similar framework to Table 2.5, we relate the explanatory variables to
an indicator for whether the respondent prefers that either both partners work or only the female
partner works. Results are reported in Table 1.11. In general, most coefficient estimates are similar
in sign and size to the specifications in Table 2.5. The presence of children is negatively correlated
with positive attitudes towards female labor force participation. Again, this relationship is weak
and statistically insignificant for the Nordic countries. For the remaining countries, we observe
17We do not include the GINI coefficient in these regressions as most of the variation in the GINI is between the
country groups rather than within them. Including the coefficient for the other Western destinations its estimate
has a negative sign but is not statistically significant. Within the group of non-Western countries the estimated
effect is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple -0.00310 0.0140 0.0155 -0.0984 0.0423 0.222
(0.0534) (0.0512) (0.0483) (0.190) (0.0788) (0.154)
Female power couple 0.0531 0.0314 0.0390 0.0101 0.0111 0.277
(0.0699) (0.0657) (0.0442) (0.272) (0.114) (0.188)
Male power couple -0.161** -0.146** -0.324* -0.0834 -0.135 -0.0565
(0.0727) (0.0685) (0.178) (0.195) (0.102) (0.175)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.233*** -0.240*** -0.0696* -0.367** -0.239*** -0.454***
(0.0506) (0.0483) (0.0376) (0.173) (0.0755) (0.170)
Youngest child 7+ -0.130*** -0.106** -0.0761 -0.200 -0.132** -0.00737
(0.0468) (0.0445) (0.0461) (0.160) (0.0639) (0.158)
GINI -2.234***
(0.437)
Nordic countries 0.214***
(0.0375)
United States -0.178***
(0.0623)
Non-Western countries -0.152**
(0.0660)
Constant 1.575*** 0.850*** 1.003*** 0.817*** 0.846*** 0.619***
(0.137) (0.0526) (0.0401) (0.183) (0.0718) (0.147)
R-squared 0.136 0.160 0.179 0.071 0.056 0.205
Observations 465 505 105 81 255 64
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.10: Linear probability regressions: Female labor force participation abroad in 2008.
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple 0.0780 0.091 0.0854 0.0371 0.0771 0.312
(0.0587) (0.0557) (0.0806) (0.186) (0.0841) (0.143)
Female power couple -0.00404 -0.0242 0.0548 0.119 -0.169 0.35
(0.0843) (0.0791) (0.0881) (0.263) (0.131) (0.238)
Male power couple -0.153* -0.124* -0.290 -0.177 -0.149 0.138
(0.0780) (0.0738) (0.202) (0.183) (0.107) (0.18)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.227*** -0.231*** -0.052 -0.384** -0.246*** -0.514***
(0.0525) (0.0498) (0.054) (0.189) (0.077) (0.148)
Youngest child 7+ -0.210*** -0.192*** -0.129* -0.382** -0.168** -0.317**
(0.0503) (0.0471) (0.0717) (0.179) (0.0672) (0.132)
GINI -2.148***
(0.481)
Nordic countries 0.189***
(0.0431)
United States -0.226***
(0.0635)
Non-Western countries 0.0102
(0.0683)
Constant 1.518*** 0.829*** 0.932*** 0.787*** 0.847*** 0.816***
(0.153) (0.0578) (0.188) (0.188) (0.0836) (0.116)
R-squared 0.141 0.154 0.139 0.089 0.080 0.153
Observations 434 467 97 76 239 55
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.11: Linear probability regressions: Preference for female labor force participation.
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that the presence of children is negatively related to positive attitudes towards the female partner
participating in the labor market.
Coefficient estimates for the GINI variable indicate that larger income differences in the country
of residence are associated with lower preferences towards the female partner being in the labor
market, as reflected in actual labor force participation outcomes. The dummy variables for Nordic
countries and the US are similar in sign and size as in Table 2.5. The same holds for the constants
when comparing separate estimations for different groups of Western countries. We interpret these
findings as evidence that the differences in labor force participation between the US, the Nordic
countries and other Western countries reflect actual preferences and are to a lesser extent driven
by legal work restrictions for family migrants, in particular in the US, even though this could
potentially play an important role. On the other hand, we observe that actual labor force par-
ticipation of the female partner is lower than preferred labor force participation in non-Western
countries. This suggests that other restrictions or the lack of employment opportunities for the
female partner might play a role in explaining low female labor force participation among couples
in these countries.
As discussed above, the differences between the Nordic and the other countries may be related
to various explanations. Labor market and social policies shape self-selection and labor supply
decisions of the emigrant couples. Child care programs in the Nordic countries are far more gener-
ous compared to other countries. This could explain why having young children does not seem to
be a strong impediment to female labor force participation among couples living in other Nordic
countries and why preference towards female labor force participation among the emigrant couples
is higher there. The provision of subsidies in the Nordic countries lowers the price for child care
services and increases incentives for female labor force participation. Table A9 in the appendix
shows that a higher value of the "Starting Well Index" described above is also associated with
stronger preferences towards the female partner being in the labor market.
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Preference for Actual
female labor force female labor force
participation participation
Power couple 0.0797 0.0948* -0.00367 0.0144
(0.0570) (0.0546) (0.0525) (0.0512)
Female power couple 0.00378 -0.0157 0.0572 0.0884
(0.0834) (0.0787) (0.0698) (0.0660)
Male power couple -0.147* -0.117 -0.160** -0.144**
(0.0777) (0.0739) (0.0725) (0.0688)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.241*** -0.245*** -0.241*** -0.243***
(0.0537) (0.0512) (0.0511) (0.0492)
Youngest child 7+ -0.202*** -0.188*** -0.122*** -0.104**
(0.0504) (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0446)
Mother out of LF at respondent’s age 12 -0.0880* -0.0796* -0.0635 -0.0224
(0.0491) (0.0474) (0.0455) (0.0445)
GINI -2.187*** -2.271***
(0.474) (0.434)
Nordic countries 0.184*** 0.213***
(0.0430) (0.0375)
United States -0.228*** -0.179***
(0.0639) (0.0624)
Non-Western countries 0.0109 -0.152**
(0.0675) (0.0662)
Constant 1.554*** 0.851*** 1.603*** 0.856***
(0.150) (0.0574) (0.135) (0.0527)
R-squared 0.148 0.159 0.140 0.160
Observations 434 467 465 505
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.12: Linear probability regressions: Inter-generational transmission and female labor force
participation.
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Overall, the results are in line with what our theory predicts. Differences in child care prices
and in wage distribution can rationalize differences in female labor force participation between
different countries of residence. In addition to the price mechanism, differences between couples
living in different destinations could reflect Tiebout sorting. To evaluate whether couples differ
in their behavior already in Denmark, so that couples with lower female labor force participation
would self-select into destinations with wider wage differences and less generous child care pro-
vision, we analyzed female labor force participation in Denmark, parallel to the analysis abroad
in Table A11. The results suggest that there are no statistically significant differences between
couples migrating to different destinations before emigration, once power type and the presence
of children are controlled for. Furthermore, the effect of having young children in Denmark is
very similar to the effect of having young children in other Nordic countries, which is again in line
with what our theoretical model suggests. This does not exclude the possibility of Tiebout sorting
in terms of preferences toward male breadwinner or dual-earner model, but it also shows that if
there is such sorting, it is in terms of preferences whose realizations are not observable in Denmark.
Fernández et al. (2004) find evidence for the US that wives of men whose mothers worked are
themselves significantly more likely to work. Along the same lines, Moen et al. (1997) provide evi-
dence that daughters’ and mothers’ gender role identities are closely related, including preferences
towards the division of labor in the household. For Table 1.12, we take the first two specifications
from Table 2.5 and Table 1.11 and add an additional regressor capturing labor force participation
of the mother of the respondent at the age of 12. The idea is, first, to test whether preferences to-
wards the division of labor are transmitted to the children. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.12 confirm
that the respondent is more likely to prefer a male breadwinner model if the parents’ household
economy was more traditional - after including the same covariates as in Table 1.11. Robustness
analysis confirms that these results do not depend on whether the respondent was male or female.
However, when explaining actual female labor force participation abroad, the coefficient estimate
for labor force participation of the respondent’s mother becomes insignificant. As an additional
test of Tiebout sorting, we analyze the effects of mother’s labor force participation on subsequent
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choice of the destination country. Table A12 relates labor force participation of the respondent’s
mother to the likelihood of living in one of the considered country groups. We do not find evidence
for sorting according to this indicator into different destinations. Preferences towards the division
of labor which were transmitted from the parents to the respondents do not help to explain much
of the variation in female labor force participation abroad, indicating that labor supply decisions
and the division of labor among the partners abroad are rather shaped by economic incentives.
Non-Nordic
All Countries countries
Power couple 0.0136 0.0774 -0.0485 0.100
(0.0541) (0.0586) (0.0668) (0.0738)
Female power couple 0.0690 -0.00529 0.0607 -0.0251
(0.0691) (0.0845) (0.0933) (0.116)
Male power couple -0.184*** -0.149* -0.113 -0.115
(0.0694) (0.0782) (0.0791) (0.0878)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.271*** -0.230*** -0.321*** -0.295***
(0.0504) (0.0523) (0.0644) (0.0687)
Youngest child 7+ -0.137*** -0.207*** -0.139** -0.234***
(0.0450) (0.0503) (0.0573) (0.0623)
FLFP rate in country 0.318 0.422 -0.3730 0.0379
of residence (0.340) (0.405) (0.3886) (0.577)
GINI -2.161*** -1.544**
(0.488) (0.727)
Constant 0.697*** 1.285*** 1.009*** 1.296***
(0.207) (0.277) (0.229) (0.285)
R-squared 0.082 0.144 0.077 0.099
Observations 504 434 399 337
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
FLFP rate according to estimates by International Labour Organization for 2008.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.13: Linear probability regressions: Actual female labor force participation of emigrants
and female labor force participation rates in the country of residence.
A potential alternative explanation for our findings might be that labor force participation among
females in our sample converges systematically to average female labor force participation rates in
the destination countries. Among the native population female labor force participation rates are
generally higher in the Nordic countries while they are lower in other Western countries and the
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US (OECD, 2015). In Table 1.13 we additionally include female labor force participation rates in
the country of residence instead of the GINI coefficient to explain female labor force participation
in our sample abroad. Column 1 shows that the probability for the female partner participating in
the labor force seems to be higher when labor force participation rates in the country of residence
population is high. However, this relationship is statistically not significant and breaks down when
excluding the Nordic countries from the sample: Then a higher female labor force participation
rate in the country of residence is associated not statistically significant with only a very slightly
increasing propensity for the female partner participating in the labor force among the couples.
When including additionally the GINI coefficient in the regressions increases the R-squared show-
ing that this measure explains a significant part of the variation in female labor force participation.
These results go against the alternative explanation and underlines that the price mechanisms we
describe with our model are more important to explain the observed outcomes.
Table A13 provides sensitivity analysis for the results with respect to the emigration years in our
data. We do not find differences between the results for couples having emigrated in the earlier
years 1987/88, 1992/93, 1997/98 compared with the later cohorts having emigrated in 2001/02.
This additionally confirms that our results do not seem to be driven by an assimilation process
towards average labor force participation rates in the destination countries.
Relative Contributions to Household Economies
Table 1.14 presents regression results for the binary dependent variable "male partner contributes
more to the joint household economy". We include similar control variables as in Table 2.5 and
1.11. Results show that a higher male contribution is more likely in all countries among male power
couples. Moreover, in couples with children the male partner more often contributes a higher share
to the joint household economy. This effect is statistically significant for all Western countries.
Furthermore, the intercept estimates indicate that a higher male contribution to joint household
economies is more likely in the US and the non-Western countries. Again, the correlation between
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the GINI coefficient and the dependent variable indicates that income differences between the
countries of residence might be driving these differences.
Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple 0.0987* 0.0873 -0.0775 0.131 0.187** 0.0711
(0.0580) (0.0549) (0.134) (0.116) (0.0842) (0.0838)
Female power couple 0.0261 0.0281 0.0109 0.0250 0.116 -0.217
(0.0838) (0.0805) (0.165) (0.175) (0.124) (0.209)
Male power couple 0.218*** 0 197*** 0.236 0.204 0.277*** 0.116
(0.0599) (0.0550) (0.160) (0.124) (0.0873) (0.0796)
Youngest child 0-6 0.286*** 0.273*** 0.282** 0.339*** 0.303*** 0.0336
(0.0568) (0.0535) (0.115) (0.126) (0.0818) (0.0933)
Youngest child 7+ 0.320*** 0.296*** 0.371*** 0.258** 0.333*** 0.0919
(0.0536) (0.0507) (0.117) (0.130) (0.0760) (0.0895)
GINI 1.915***
(0.327)
Nordic countries -0.202***
(0.0532)
United States 0.104***
(0.0368)
Non-Western countries 0.149***
(0.0424)
Constant 0.178 0.466*** 0.324** 0.536*** 0.357*** 0.836***
(0.123) (0.0657) (0.139) (0.173) (0.0904) (0.100)
Observations 477 519 109 84 260 66
R-squared 0.196 0.213 0.115 0.198 0.166 0.14
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.14: Linear probability regressions: Male partner contributes more to joint household
economy in 2008.
For Table 1.15 we re-estimate the specifications from Table 1.14 for couples in which both part-
ners are in the labor force. The estimated effect for being male power couple on the dependent
variable is statistically significantly positive. Child presence also has a strong positive effect on
the likelihood of a joint household economy with a higher male income share.
Again, we estimate a positive statistically significant relationship between the GINI index and the
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple 0.0772 0.0761 -0.144 0.103 0.195* 0.115
(0.0722) (0.0687) (0.143) (0.161) (0.100) (0.155)
Female power couple 0.0269 0.0417 -0.0147 0.0174 0.0743 -0.0650
(0.0987) (0.0743) (0.175) (0.205) (0.143) (0.269)
Male power couple 0.240*** 0.227*** 0.270 0.317* 0.279** 0.195
(0.0776) (0.0723) (0.169) (0.166) (0.107) (0.145)
Youngest child 0-6 0.304*** 0.295*** 0.215* 0.569*** 0.306*** 0.0599
(0.0680) (0.0651) (0.120) (0.189) (0.100) (0.152)
Youngest child 7+ 0.378*** 0.350*** 0.319** 0.399** 0.411*** 0.127
(0.0620) (0.0600) (0.125) (0.182) (0.0871) (0.149)
GINI 1.593***
(0.422)
Nordic countries -0.153***
(0.0591)
United States 0.0957*
(0.0560)
Non-Western countries 0.176***
(0.0563)
Constant 0.138 0.387*** 0.404*** 0.326* 0.269*** 0.737***
(0.148) (0.0762) (0.149) (0.179) (0.0989) (0.158)
Observations 351 379 99 47 193 40
R-squared 0.186 0.201 0.109 0.308 0.201 0.116
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sample: Both partners work abroad
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1.15: Linear probability regressions: Male partner contributes more to joint household
economy in 2008 among dual-earner couples.
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dependent variable. Country dummies indicate a difference between the other Nordic countries,
the US and the remaining Western countries. Dual-earner couples in the Nordic countries are less
likely to have joint household economies where the male partner contributes more. Dual-earner
couples in the US are slightly more likely to have joint household economies where the male partner
contributes more, although the effect is only statistically significant at the 10% level. A separate
estimation for the different country groups reveals that the presence of children is related to a
higher male contribution to joint household economies among dual-earner couples in all West-
ern countries. In non-Western countries, the presence of children is not related to higher male
household economy contributions; however, the intercept estimate indicates that a higher male
contribution in these countries is generally more frequent.
Tables A14 and A15 show that our results still hold when including an indicator variable for whether
the male partner contributed more to joint family income in Denmark before migration. If this
was the case in Denmark, it is significantly more likely that the male contributes more in 2008, too.
1.6 Conclusion
We analyzed motivations to emigrate, labor market participation and household economies of
Danish couples who have emigrated between 1987 and 2002 and stayed abroad at least until 2008.
Denmark is one of the most gender-equal countries worldwide, with a high female labor force
participation rate. Despite this, we found big gender differences in main motivations to emigrate
and in labor force participation abroad. Own work was the main reason to emigrate for 74.7%
of men and 21.7% of women, partner’s job or other family reasons for 6.0% of men and 53.0%
of women. Accordingly, Danish emigrant couples often adopt more traditional gender roles in
non-Nordic countries abroad with a male breadwinner and the female staying at home. In the
United States, the male works in almost all couples and the female in half. In the other Western
countries, both partners work in two thirds of couples, and the male works while the female stays
at home in one quarter of couples. The male stays at home and the female works in less than one
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percent of couples that have emigrated. As a result of reduced female labor force participation,
couples increasingly pool their earnings: the share of couples with separate economies declined
from 12.6% before migration to 2.5% abroad, and the share of couples in which the male brings in
all the money increased from 3.1% to 24.3%.
Lower female labor force participation could reflect both, demand and supply side effects. Po-
tential legal constraints or a lack of labor market opportunities could force the female partner
out of the labor force, but it could also be that lower female labor supply is an adjustment to
wider wage differences abroad and couples preferring a traditional male breadwinner model would
be more likely to self-select into emigration. Our results suggest that both demand and supply
side mechanisms are important. Demand side restrictions appear to play a role especially in non-
Western countries, where the share of couples in which only the male works is considerably larger
than the share of couples stating that they prefer such a situation. In the Western countries,
preferred and actual female labor force participation are closely in line, suggesting the primacy of
labor supply decisions. Our theoretical framework illustrates the role of incentives in this context:
Wider income differences as well as higher prices for child care can economically rationalize that
the female partner reduces labor supply or stays out of the labor force. The empirical findings
for female labor force participation abroad confirm the hypotheses derived from our model. After
migration we observe decreased female labor force participation in countries with wider income
differences. Female labor force participation is lower in the non-Nordic countries where incomes
are more dispersed, like in the US. Reduced female labor force participation in the US and non-
Western countries is particularly evident among couples with pre-school age children.
We do not find direct evidence for Tiebout sorting in terms of differences in pre-migration behavior.
There are no big differences in female labor force participation rates in Denmark before emigration
for couples living later in different countries. However, we observe that a significant fraction of
couples with children migrating outside other Nordic countries viewed considerations related to
children as a reason to emigrate, and very few as a reason against emigration. Among couples
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migrating to other Nordic countries, very few viewed considerations related to children being
either in favor or against emigration. One possible explanation for this is that those parents
who think that it is better for children that one of the parents, almost always the mother, would
take care of them at home, would be more likely to emigrate outside other Nordic countries, and
switch abroad from dual-earner model to the male breadwinner model. This explanation is in line
with the observation that the presence of young children significantly reduces female labor force
participation outside other Nordic countries, while its effect in other Nordic countries is small and
statistically insignificant.
Chapter 2
Family Decision-Making on
International Migration∗
2.1 Introduction
Already Frank (1978), Mincer (1978) and DaVanzo (1978) showed that family ties are an im-
portant impediment to migration within national borders. Subsequent literature has confirmed
that migration decisions appear to be driven primarily by the male partner’s job opportunities.1
However, little is known about how partners make their migration decision. To what extent do
partners who migrate together share the preference to migrate, and to what extent would one
of the partners have actually preferred not to migrate, but compromised on his or her preferred
location to stay together? Also, little is known about international migration of families, especially
outside the context of developing countries.2 Does the extent to which partners agree on migration
differ between destinations, for example when comparing more and less gender egalitarian destina-
tion countries? We address both knowledge gaps. We develop a theoretical model for bargaining
on migration decisions. From there we derive and test hypotheses on how individual and family
characteristics are correlated with the partners’ gains or losses from migration and, thus, their
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Panu Poutvaara.
1Recent studies include Compton and Pollak (2007), Blackburn (2010), Tenn (2010), and Gemici (2011) for the
United States, Rabe (2011) for the United Kingdom and Nivalainen (2004) for Finland.
2See Docquier and Rapoport (2006) for a survey on literature related to family migration and remittances in
the developing country context.
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migration preferences. Using unique survey data we are the first to provide empirical evidence on
the partners’ preferences towards joint emigration.
Our empirical analysis uses survey data on Danish emigrants, restricting the attention to 522
respondents who had the same partner at the time of the survey as at the time of emigration.
Denmark has one of the highest female labor force participation rates among OECD countries
reaching 76% in 2010 (OECD 2011), although many women work only part-time. On top of this,
the country is one of the world leaders in gender equality, having the third place in the United
Nations Human Development Report (Klugman 2011). Therefore, we expect that family migration
from Denmark would be more responsive to female preferences than family migration from less
equal societies.
Our model analyzes migration probabilities of singles and dual-earner couples in which both part-
ners work. Job offers abroad depends on wage at home and an individual-specific component which
may obtain positive or negative values. Our model predicts that in dual-earner couples, a higher
own wage decreases the own probability of becoming a tied mover, but increases the partner’s
probability of becoming a tied mover. Higher household surplus increases both partners’ proba-
bilities of becoming a tied mover. The reason is that if household surplus increases, it becomes
more likely that the partner who would gain privately from migration is willing to compensate the
partner who would lose. Despite compensation, it is possible that the accompanying spouse is left
worse off after migration (but never worse off than the outside option of staying and splitting up).
We find that emigration is typically a shared family preference among the Danish emigrant cou-
ples. Nonetheless, men are usually more strongly in favor of emigrating. If there is disagreement
on emigration, it is usually the female partner who would have preferred to stay in Denmark. The
emphasis on the male’s preference is strongest if the male partner has a college degree. However,
even among couples in which the female partner is relatively higher educated, it is more common
that the male rather than the female preferred to emigrate. Therefore, women seem to be more
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often "tied movers" even when being better educated. This finding is most pronounced among male
power couples with children. When comparing different destinations, the share of couples with
the male having the stronger preference to emigrate is somewhat lower and the share of couples
with the female having the stronger preference to emigrate is somewhat higher to other Nordic
countries than to the United States, the other Western countries or the non-Western countries, but
even among couples migrating to other Nordic countries the male partner’s preference was about
three times more often stronger than the female partner’s. We test our model’s hypotheses among
dual-earner couples in which both partners work more than 60% of full working time in the year
before emigration. Our results confirm that the likelihood for the male partner being in favor of
emigration while the female partner had less strong preferences or was even against emigration
decreases with earnings of the female partner. This is in line with predictions from the model.
Theoretically, already Mincer (1978) and Mont (1989) showed that conflicting location preferences
among partners lead to higher opportunity costs for relocation compared to single households.
They abstracted from the possibility of separation and assumed that both partners agree to maxi-
mize joint family income. Guler et al. (2012) analyze couples’ location constraints by developing a
joint search theory. In their framework an external job offer to one partner changes the reservation
wage of the other partner who might become a tied mover and search for a job at the new location
if his or her initial earnings were sufficiently low. The model also builds on a unitary household in
which both partners pool their incomes. Individual earnings losses of a "tied mover" would always
be fully compensated in such a framework. Becker (1974) argues, however, that considering the
household as a unitary decision-making agent imposes strong assumptions on individual prefer-
ences.
Contributions by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) explain family
decision-making in a cooperative Nash bargaining model. Their framework allows to analyze the
distribution of income within the family according to the partners’ outside options and their bar-
gaining powers. Assuming full commitment, e.g. through the possibility of ex-ante transfers, the
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cooperative Nash bargaining model always implies efficient bargaining outcomes. The cooperative
bargaining approach was conceptualized generalized further by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps
and Rees (1988) as the collective family model. In a dynamic context though, where commitment
is not possible, Lundberg and Pollack (2003) argue that bargaining family bargaining might also
lead to inefficient outcomes. A comprehensive overview on cooperative and non-cooperative bar-
gaining in the household can be found in Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2014). In the context
of long term international migration we will formalize individual preferences and decision-making
on migration among couples using a cooperative Nash bargaining model. The derived hypotheses
are then tested with the survey data on Danish emigrant couples, confirming the theoretical pre-
dictions. We restrict our analysis to one-time decision on whether to migrate. While there are a
few papers that have analyzed repeated migration decisions (e.g. Gemici, 2011), a challenge in our
context is that we cannot observe how potential job offers abroad would change over time. We re-
frain from presenting a dynamic model of repeated decisions as our data would not allow testing it.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model on family
bargaining and derives testable hypotheses from it. Section 3 describes our data and 4 presents
stylized facts. In the light of our theoretical bargaining framework we present some empirical
evidence on Danish emigrant couples in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
We consider family decision-making on migration as a Nash bargaining game in which both partners
face individual-specific job opportunities at home and abroad. We model household decisions on
permanent emigration as a one-shot-game without taking a dynamic perspective.3 While our
modelling of migration costs and job opportunities is borrowed from Junge et al. (2014), the
modelling of partners’ decision-making is richer. Junge et al. (2014) assumed that the couple
always stays together or migrates together, while we allow the partners to split. Furthermore,
we model household surplus from being together as a couple and study how this is related to
migration decisions. We compute migration probabilities first for a single person and then for a
couple without and with a tied mover. We analyze how these probabilities respond to a change in
the partners’ wages, migration costs and the couple’s household surplus. After deriving predictions
from the theory we formulate hypotheses which we are going to test with data on Danish emigrant
families.
2.2.1 Utility of a Single
The wage for an individual i in the home country 0 is denoted by wi. For an individual as single
wage equals utility,
us0i = wi.
The wage abroad, in country indexed by 1, depends on wage at home and an individual-specific
random variable xi. Individual-specific random variable and productivity at home are combined
in a multiplicative fashion, so that the wage abroad equals (1 + xi)wi. Positive values of xi are
associated with superior job opportunities abroad, negative values with job offer abroad falling
below what is available at home. We also assume that xi ∈ [x, x̄] with −1 < x < 0 < x̄. This
guarantees that wage abroad cannot be negative. In addition, individual has to pay fixed migration
cost ci in case of emigration. If a single person i emigrates to country 1 he or she would have utility
that depends on wage abroad net of migration costs:
3see e.g. Lundberg and Pollack (1996) who develop a household bargaining model in a dynamic, and non-
cooperative setting.
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us1i = (1 + xi)wi − ci.
i migrates if net migration gains are positive, i.e.
xiwi − c > 0.
Setting the left-hand side equal to zero allows solving for cut-off level of random variable x̃i so that
if xi > x̃i, individual i migrates:
x̃i =
ci
wi
.
The probability that a single person migrates is Pi = 1−F (x̃i), F (.) being the cumulative density
function for the distribution of xi. As ∂x̃i∂ci > 0 and
∂x̃i
∂wi
< 0, the probability of emigration is
decreasing in migration costs and increasing in the wage rate.
2.2.2 Utilities in a Couple
In a couple both partners, a and b, earn individual wages wa and wb in the home country. Without
loss of generality we set wa ≥ wb. Additionally, the partners can consume a joint household
surplus h > 0 in case they stay together, either in the home country or abroad. In case partners
emigrate together to the same destination, they each face an individual-specific random term
related to earnings abroad and also pay individual migration costs as defined above for singles.
For simplicity we assume from now on ca = cb = c. At the time of decision-making both partners
know their wage realization abroad in case of migration. We assume that the partners engage in
Nash bargaining, either with a possibility of committing to future transfers, or making a transfer
ex ante. The outside option of each partner is the choice he or she would make as single. The
assumption that partners can commit to future transfers, or carry out ex ante transfers without
liquidity constraints, implies that the couple is able to coordinate on locating efficiently on the
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utility possibility frontier. This means that the migration decision is made to maximize the sum
of individual incomes, net of eventual migration costs, and household surplus. Hence, with linear,
additively separable utilities, joint emigration requires that the sum of both partners’ gains from
migration is positive, i.e.
xawa + xbwb − 2c > 0. (2.1)
Staying in the home country, without migration incentives for neither partner the couple bargains
under the following resource constraint:
uc0a + uc0b = wa + wb + h. (2.2)
If (2.1) holds and joint migration to 1 can be Pareto improving for both partners the resource
constraint for bargaining is
uc1a + uc1b = (1 + xa)wa + (1 + xb)wb − 2c+ h. (2.3)
We consider a divorce-threat Nash bargaining framework. If (2.1) holds the couple maximizes a
Nash bargaining function s.t. (2.3). The threat point of each partner is determined by his or her
outside option, i.e. the individual migration incentive and optimal location choice as single. The
partners’ exogenous bargaining powers are α for a and 1− α for b with α ∈ [0, 1].
In case neither partner has a migration incentive, or in the absence of migration possibilities, the
Nash bargaining solution maximizes
(uc0a − wa)α(uc0b − wb)1−α
s.t. (2.2). This yields individual utilities of
uc0a = wa + αh,
uc0b = wb + (1− α)h.
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If both partners have an individual incentive to emigrate, there is no conflict of interest on the
location and the Nash bargaining solution maximizes
(uc1a − (1 + xa)wa + c)α(uc1b − (1 + xb)wb + c)1−α
s.t. (2.3). The solution to the bargaining problem is then
uc1a = (1 + xa)wa − c+ αh,
uc1b = (1 + xb)wb − c+ (1− α)h.
If (2.1) holds and partner a has a migration incentive but b not, the Nash solution maximizes
(uc1a − (1 + xa)wa + c)α(uc1b − wb)1−α
s.t. (2.3) if the couple emigrates.
If (2.1) holds and partner b has a migration incentive but a not, the Nash solution maximizes
(uc1a − wa)α(uc1b − (1 + xb)wb + c)1−α
s.t. (2.3) if the couple emigrates.
This yields
uc1a = (1 + xa)wa − c+ α(h+ xbwb − c),
uc1b = wb + (1− α)(h+ xbwb − c).
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The corresponding result for a as a tied mover is
uc1a = wa − c+ α(h+ xawa − c),
uc1b = (1 + xb)wb + (1− α)(h+ xawa − c).
These results yield that income losses of the tied mover are shared among the partners according
to the bargaining powers. In this framework the tied mover is always worse off in terms of util-
ity, compared to the situation before migration. He/she receives his/her outside option plus the
remaining share of the household surplus net of own income losses. In case both partners would
also migrate as singles, i.e. neither of them is a tied mover, there are no intra-family transfers.
The partners divide the household surplus as in the home country according to the sharing rule
derived above.
From this bargaining solution we can also derive the sufficient conditions for joint emigration and
household stability: The losses of a potential tied mover must be smaller than joint household
surplus. In case b would face individual income losses, i.e. xbwb − c < 0, it has to hold
h+ xbwb − c > 0. (2.4)
The corresponding condition for a as a tied mover is
h+ xawa − c > 0. (2.5)
If (2.1) is satisfied but (2.4) or (2.5) is not, the partner who wants to emigrate could improve by
migrating alone and the tied mover would be better off staying behind than migrating. Then, the
couple would dissolve and give up joint household surplus h. This illustrates that unequal gains
from migration can cause relationship instability, as pointed out by Mincer (1978) and Gemici
(2011). Note that these conditions are independent of the partners’ bargaining powers, if coordi-
nation on an efficient outcome and ex-ante transfers are possible.
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2.2.3 Migration Probabilities
In the following, we assume that xa and xb are both uniformly distributed and independent. Al-
lowing for positive correlation between xa and xb would alleviate potential conflict and make joint
migration more likely. xa and xb ∈ [x, x̄] with x̄−x = 1 for simplicity. Furthermore, 0 ≤ c ≤ x̄wa,b.
Recall that a single person i would emigrate if net migration surplus from migration is positive,
i.e. xi > cwi . If xi is uniformly distributed, as described above, the probability for emigration of i
is ∫ x̄
c
wi
1
x̄− x
dxi =
∫ x̄
c
wi
1dxi = x̄−
c
wi
.
For migration probabilities of a couple we integrate over the bivariate probability distribution of
possible realizations and analyze the outcomes. As we showed above the necessary condition for
joint emigration is a positive sum of net migration surplus of a and b (2.1). Moreover, the suffi-
cient conditions for household stability, (2.4) and (2.5), must hold if the couple emigrates together.
Under these conditions Figure 2.1 illustrates the different migration scenarios in the xa,xb space.
We distinguish three cases in which both partners emigrate jointly: one without a tied mover and
two with a tied mover.
Joint Emigration without a Tied Mover
In the first case both partners would have own migration incentives as singles, i.e. xa > cwa and
xb >
c
wb
. This can be written as
x̄∫
c
wa
x̄∫
c
wb
1
x̄− x
dxbdxa =
x̄∫
c
wb
x̄− c
wa
dxb = (x̄−
c
wa
)(x̄− c
wb
) = P1(joint migration w/o tied mover).
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Joint Emigration with a Tied Mover
We call j = [a; b] a tied mover if xj < cwj . As shown in (2.4) and (2.5) the loss that j faces in
terms of lower earnings and migration costs abroad cannot exceed total household surplus h. The
partner with migration incentives will compensate j as long as the necessary transfers to j do
not exceed total household surplus h (conditions (2.4) and (2.5)). The pattern of compensation
payments will depend on the weights of the underlying Nash bargaining process.
We calculate the probability that b is a tied mover (case 2). From the conditions derived above we
obtain bounds for the random variables xa and xb that describe the situation in which b is a tied
mover: As a has to have a migration incentive and both partners migrate together we know from
(2.1) that xa > 2c−xbwbwa . Using condition (2.4), we know that xb >
c−h
wb
. Moreover, we require b to
be a tied mover without own migration incentive, xb < cwb . Integrating over possible values of xa
and xb yields
c
wb∫
c−h
wb

x̄∫
2c−xbwb
wa
1
x̄− x
dxa
 dxb =
c
wb∫
c−h
wb

x̄∫
2c−xbwb
wa
1dxa
 dxb
=
c
wb∫
c−h
wb
(
x̄− 2c− xbwb
wa
)
dxb
=
h(wax̄− c− 12h)
wawb
= P2(b is tied mover).
For case 3, a is a tied mover, the problem is symmetric and yields
c
wa∫
c−h
wa

x̄∫
2c−xawa
wb
1
x̄− x
dxb
 dxa = h(wbx̄− c− 12h)wawb = P3(a is tied mover).
These calculations require that x̄wb − c− h ≥ 0 (under the assumption wb ≤ wa). The Appendix
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provides calculations for different corner solutions with x̄wb − c − h < 0 (and x̄wa − c − h < 0),
including a distinction between the case of relatively small and large wage differences between a
and b which becomes relevant then.
Total Joint Emigration Probability
The three cases together describe all possible events in which the couple emigrates: Without a
tied mover, with a as a tied mover and with b as a tied mover. The probability of joint migration
for the couple is, thus
P4(joint emigration) = P1 + P2 + P3 =
h(wax̄+ wbx̄− 2c− h)
wawb
+ (x̄− c
wa
)(x̄− c
wb
).
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the different cases in which joint migration occurs. They plot partner
a’s job opportunities abroad on the horizontal and partner b’s job opportunities abroad on the ver-
tical axis. As the distribution of xa and xb is uniform over the interval x to x̄ the surface indicated
with P1, P2 and P3 corresponds to the migration probabilities derived above. The illustration in
Figure 2.1 refers to the case in which wa = wb and h > c; Figure 2.2 provides an example for a
situation in which wa > wb and h < c.
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Figure 2.1: Conditions for joint emigration of a couple (illustration for wa = wb and h > c).
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Figure 2.2: Conditions for joint emigration of a couple (illustration for wa > wb and h < c).
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2.2.4 Comparative Statics
The following derivatives provide useful insights into the effects of changes of wa, wb, c and h on
the probabilities above.
∂P4
∂wa

> 0 if c > h
ambiguous if c < h
,
∂P4
∂wb

> 0 if c > h
ambiguous if c < h
,
∂P4
∂c
< 0, ∂P4
∂h
> 0.
∂P2
∂wa
> 0, ∂P2
∂wb
< 0, ∂P2
∂c
< 0, ∂P2
∂h
> 0.
(Corresponding Results for P3)
The comparative statics with respect to P1 tell that the likelihood of joint emigration without a
tied mover is increasing in both partners’ incomes, and decreasing in migration costs. Household
surplus has no effect on joint migration without a tied mover. The comparative statics with respect
to P2 and P3 show that the likelihood of being a tied mover is decreasing in own income and in the
migration cost, and increasing in the partner’s income and in the household surplus. The intuition
with respect to own income and partner’s income is that if the partners have diverging preferences,
the magnitude of both potential gains and losses is increasing in own income, making it more likely
to be able to compensate the partner if he or she is a tied mover, and less likely to be able to be
compensated. An increase in household surplus, instead, increases the cost of breakup and makes
it more likely that a compensation can be agreed upon, in case of diverging migration preferences.
Note that if there would be no household surplus (h = 0), there would be no tied movers and both
P2 and P3 would equal zero.
The most surprising result is that if c < h, the effect of the primary earner’s income on the prob-
ability that a couple emigrates is ambiguous. A priori, one could expect that the effect would be
always positive, as higher income of the primary earner means that potential gains from emigration
increase. Furthermore, Junge et al. (2014) concluded, in a model in which couples always stay
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together of migrate together, that the probability of emigration always increases in the primary
earner’s income. This conclusion no longer holds if the couple can break up, and total household
surplus is larger than individual migration cost.
Furthermore, we can compute conditional probabilities for emigrating as a tied mover in a couple
conditional on emigration. The probability that b is a tied mover conditional on joint emigration is
P2
P4
=
h(waxa − c− 12h)
h(wax̄+ wbx̄− 2c− h) + wawbx̄2 − wax̄c− wbx̄c+ c2
The results for a as a tied mover are straight forward and derived in a similar way.
The corresponding derivatives w.r.t. wa, wb, c and h can be computed and yield the following
results:
∂ P2
P4
∂wa
> 0,
∂ P2
P4
∂wb
< 0,
∂ P2
P4
∂c
: ambiguous,
∂ P2
P4
∂h
> 0.
(Corresponding results for P3
P4
)
Based on these conditional probabilities of couple migration with a tied mover and the presented
comparative statics results we can derive hypotheses to test with our data.
1. A higher own wage in the home country decreases the probability for being a tied mover,
unconditional and conditional on joint emigration.
2. A higher wage of the partner in the home country increases the probability for being a tied
mover, unconditional and conditional on joint emigration.
3. Higher household surplus increases the probability that either partner is a tied mover (un-
conditional and conditional on joint emigration).
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4. The impact of an increase in migration costs for both partners, for example, due to the
presence of children, is unclear for the conditional probability of being a tied mover. Higher
migration costs reduce the unconditional probability for being a tied mover.
2.3 Data
We study household decision-making using unique survey data on Danish emigrants who had em-
igrated in 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2001 or 2002, and had not returned to Denmark
by 2008. The survey was planned by Munk and Poutvaara within the project "Danes Abroad:
Economic and Social Motivations for Emigration and Return Migration", financed by the Danish
Social Science Research Council. The survey was carried out by Statistics Denmark. A detailed
description on the data collection can be found in Poutvaara et al. (2009) for details on the sample
used in the following analysis, see Munk, Nikolka and Poutvaara (2014).
We focus on long-term emigration decisions of couples. The survey data provides information on
several pre-migration characteristics of the respondents like household composition, education and
work situation in Denmark. Most importantly, the survey respondents were asked about their
motives and preferences for emigration. We restrict our sample to respondents in a long-term
relationship being together with their partner since the time of emigration until the survey took
place in 2008. The reason for this restriction is that if the couple would have separated between
the time of emigration and survey conduction, the respondent might interpret the partner’s prefer-
ences and an eventual conflict at the time of emigration in the hindsight of the relationship having
ended. We also require that the respondent and the partner had lived together before emigration
to focus on joint migration decision-making in the household as modeled above. Furthermore, we
restrict the analysis to partners who are Danish citizens. The reason for this restriction is that
in international couples, emigration from Denmark might imply returning to the home country of
the partner, making a migration decision qualitatively different. Finally, we link respondents and
their partners with the Danish full population register data on age, gender and earnings before
migration. The remaining analysis is based on 522 respondents, as well as their partners, who
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satisfied all the above restrictions.
In the subsequent analysis, we recoded the answers the survey respondents gave on their own and
their partners’ situation and preferences. The recoded answers then refer to the male or female
partner. For example, if a male answered that "I was in favor of migration, while my partner would
have preferred to stay in Denmark", this is recoded as "Disagreement, female would have preferred
to stay".
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Our data allow us to gain important insights into intra-family decision-making on migration of
Danish emigrant couples and to test the predictions derived from the theoretical bargaining model.
We are able to link the partners’ preferences to their individual characteristics, in particular their
pre-migration earnings in Denmark. To our knowledge there is no empirical evidence on intra-
household bargaining on international migration decisions so far.
As a starting point for analyzing the complexity of household decision-making this section provides
some descriptive statistics presenting the data and the variable used in subsequent econometric
analysis. Our first question of interest is to what extent emigration was a shared preference among
the partners. We group migration preferences in five categories. There are three categories con-
taining joint migration preferences: equal migration preferences among the partners, agreement
but stronger male preference, agreement but stronger female preference towards emigration. In
two categories, there are couples having disagreed on emigration and either the female or the male
partner would have preferred to stay. Table 2.1 provides an overview on the distribution of migra-
tion preferences among the partners in our sample.
A majority of 52.0% of respondents said they had equal preferences towards migration. In the case
of unequal preferences it was mostly the male partner who was in favor of emigration (39.0%).
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No child in DK Children in DK Total
Equal preferences 52.8% 51.1% 52.0%
Agreement, stronger male preference 29.6% 34.9% 32.6%
Agreement, stronger female preference 9.0% 6.5% 8.5%
Disagreement, female would have preferred to stay 7.9% 6.2% 6.4%
Disagreement, male would have preferred to stay 0.7% 0.3% 0.6%
Observations 244 278 522
Source: Survey data.
Table 2.1: Migration preferences and child presence.
6.4% stated that only the male wanted to emigrate while the female disagreed on migration. The
female wanted to emigrate while the male disagreed in only 0.6% of the cases. Stronger female
migration preferences were more frequent among couples without children compared to couples
with children. For couples with children stronger male migration preferences were relatively more
frequent. Most couples, however, reported that migration was a shared preference. 93.1% of re-
spondents report joint agreement on migration. Moreover, in Table 2.1 we do not observe a big
difference in relative migration preferences between couples with and without children in Denmark.
In the following, we analyze the partners’ migration preferences in the light of their pre-migration
characteristics, as motivated by the theoretical model. We will emphazise especially migration
decision of dual-earner couples in which partners potentially face more divergent preferences on
international migration.
Table 2.2 relates migration preferences of the partners to the power type of the couple. Following
Costa and Kahn (2000) we will refer to different "power" types of couples in our analysis according
to their level of education and earnings potential. Power couples are characterized by a college
educated male and female partner. We refer to male or female power couples if only one partner
holds a college degree. Low power couples are those where neither partner has completed a higher
education.
Among 38.9% of the low power couples the male partner preferred more to emigrate than the
female, compared to a higher female migration preference for only 4.2%. For power couples and
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female power couples the shares are similar but stronger female migration preferences are slightly
more frequent (9.0% for power couples and 9.1% for female power couples). With 36.4% the share
of stronger male migration preferences is lowest for female power couples, but it is still around
three times higher than that of stronger female preferences. The highest share of stronger mi-
gration preferences of the male partner (50.9%) can be observed for male power couples. At the
same time, with 39.3% the share of equal migration preferences is particularly low for male power
couples. Male migration preferences, thus, are least dominant among female power couples and
most dominant for male power couples. In general, however, male preferences clearly stand out
for all education groups if migration was not an equal preference of both partners.
Table 2.2 also reports the shares in the preference categories for the different power types account-
ing for child presence in the household before migration. Children in the household do not seem
to be strongly related to relative migration preferences; this holds for low power couples, female
power couples and power couples. The higher share of stronger male migration preferences in male
power couples seems to be driven by those couples that had a child when leaving Denmark: The
share of stronger male migration preferences is 33.3% for male power couples without children, but
60.2% for those with children at the time of migration. For male power couples with children equal
migration preferences can only be observed in 32.9% of the cases. Hence, stronger male emigration
preferences are particularly frequent for male power couples if there were children in the household
before migration.
We were concerned about a bias due to misreporting of the partners’ preferences depending on
the characteristics of the partner who answered the questionnaire. Among our respondents we
identified a subsample of 60 couples where both partners answered the questionnaire. We ana-
lyzed those partners’ mutual assessment of migration preferences. Table B1 shows that in 47 of 60
cases the partners’ answers on their respective migration preferences were perfect matches. If there
were deviations, one partner mostly reported mutual agreement, while the other stated stronger
migration preferences of the male or female partner. Thus, we can expect joint migration pref-
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No child in DK Children in DK Total
Low power couples
Equal preferences 54.2% 59.6% 56.8%
Agreement, stronger male preference 35.4% 29.8% 32.6%
Agreement, stronger female preference 6.3% 2.1% 4.2%
Disagreement, female would have preferred to stay 4.2% 8.5% 6.3%
Disagreement, male would have preferred to stay 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Observations 42 44 86
Female power couples
Equal preferences 55.9% 52.4% 54.5%
Agreement, stronger male preference 23.5% 28.6% 25.5%
Agreement, stronger female preference 8.8% 9.5% 9.1%
Disagreement, female would have preferred to stay 11.8% 9.5% 10.9%
Disagreement, male would have preferred to stay 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Observations 33 20 53
Male power couples
Equal preferences 51.3% 32.9% 39.3%
Agreement, stronger male preference 25.6% 53.4% 43.8%
Agreement, stronger female preference 12.8% 6.8% 8.9%
Disagreement, female would have preferred to stay 7.7% 6.8% 7.1%
Disagreement, male would have preferred to stay 2.6% 0.0% 0.9%
Observations 34 67 101
Power couples
Equal preferences 52.1% 56.3% 54.4%
Agreement, stronger male preference 30.1% 29.3% 29.7%
Agreement, stronger female preference 8.9% 8.0% 8.4%
Disagreement, female would have preferred to stay 8.2% 5.7% 6.9%
Disagreement, male would have preferred to stay 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Observations 135 147 282
Source: Survey data.
Table 2.2: Power types, child presence and migration preferences.
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erences to be correctly assessed by one partner for most of the remaining observations in our sample.
Median male income Median female income
(monthly, DKK) (monthly, DKK)
Equal preferences 27,734 15,152
Agreement, stronger male preference 28,538 16,434
Agreement, stronger female preference 25,501 12,254
Disagreement, 32,584 13,929
female would have preferred to stay
Disagreement, 26,265 24,299
male would have preferred to stay
Source: Survey data.
Table 2.3: Income and migration preferences.
Our theoretical framework presented above relates joint migration probabilities and the partners’
migration preferences to their pre-migration earnings. In Table 2.3 we present the median of
monthly incomes in Danish Krone before emigration of the male and female partners according
to migration preferences in our sample.4 We find that median male income is particularly high in
couples where the male partner has stronger preferences towards emigration. This pattern does
not seem to hold for female median income. A high female median income stands out only among
the very few cases in which the male partner disagreed while the female partner had a strong
preference towards emigration.
Table 2.4 provides insights into the partners’ migration preferences for different destinations: the
United States, Nordic countries, other Western countries and non-Western countries. Stronger
male migration preferences are slightly more frequent among couples that emigrated to the US,
and less frequent among couples that emigrated to other Nordic countries. Among couples having
migrated to one of the other Nordic countries the share of stronger migration preferences of the
female partner is relatively higher, 13.2%, compared to the 5.1% for the US. It is 7.0% for the
other Western countries and 11.8% for the non-Western destination countries. On the other hand,
the share of stronger male migration preferences is smallest among couples having migrated to the
4Earnings presented are annual earnings divided by 12 months from the Danish administrative register data.
Annual earnings are labor income plus non-negative values for freelance income in the year before the couple has
left Denmark. Earnings are deflated using the year 2000 as the reference year.
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Other Non-
Nordic Western Western
countries US countries countries Total
Equal preferences 52.1% 51.3% 52.5% 51.3% 52.0%
Agreement, stronger male preference 28.1% 34.6% 33.8% 31.5% 32.6%
Agreement, stronger female preference 12.4% 5.1% 6.2% 11.8% 8.5%
Disagreement, female would have preferred to stay 6.6% 7.7% 6.6% 5.3% 6.4%
Disagreement, male would have preferred to stay 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.6%
Observations 114 73 259 76 522
Source: Survey data.
Table 2.4: Migration preferences by destination country.
Nordic countries. However, we would have expected gender differences with respect to migration
preferences to be even smaller to the Nordic countries compared to the US and other destinations.
In general, labor market policies in the Nordic countries, in particular for dual-earner couples, are
more family friendly, for example due to the provision of public day care services. However, even
among couples having migrated to the Nordic countries stronger male migration preferences are
clearly more frequent than stronger female preferences. Still, for all destination countries a clear
majority of couples emigrated in joint agreement, to all destination country groups 51.3% to 52.5%
of both partners had even equally strong migration preferences.
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2.5 Econometric Analysis
Based on our theoretical framework and the descriptive analysis, we expect attitudes towards
migration to be related to family characteristics and earnings potentials of the partners, in par-
ticular in dual career couples. As we observe only very few couples where the female partner has
stronger preferences towards joint emigration, we focus on stronger male migration preferences in
the econometric analysis.
In Table 2.5 we estimate a linear probability model for all couples for which we retrieve labor
market information from the register data. Compared to the descriptive analysis the estimation
results provide a more detailed insight on the relationship between pre-migration characteristics,
in particular earnings potential of the partners, and the binary dependent variable for stronger
male preferences towards joint emigration. Table 2.5 reports the regression results on a reduced
sample of 449 observations. The reason for this is that we were not able to find administrative
labor market data for partners in the sample. Our model predicted that the probability of being a
tied mover conditional on joint emigration increases with the partner’s wage and decreases with the
own wage. We include log earnings for both partners adding 1 to all values and thus also includ-
ing log earnings of partners without any income in the year before emigration. We find that the
probability for stronger male migration preferences in our sample increases with log male earnings.
This finding is robust and statistically significant across all specifications in Table 2.5. However,
we do not find any significant effect of female wages on stronger male migration preferences.
We additionally include the power type of the family as a dummy variable in our regressions.
Stronger male migration preferences are more likely among male power couples. We saw in our
descriptive analysis that this seems to be driven to a large extent by the presence of children
in the household. There are no clear results on the effect of female power couples and power
couples on migration preferences in these specifications. Furthermore, estimation results do not
reveal a clear effect for the presence of children in the household on stronger preferences of the
male partner towards emigration. In the last specification, we include a dummy variable for la-
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bor force attachment of the female partner in Denmark. In 24 cases the female partner did not
work in Denmark. The male partner, on the other hand, did not work in only three of the cou-
ples. Our results show that labor force attachment of the female parter seems to go along with
stronger male migration preferences, even though the effect is not significant. This finding is in line
with the literature describing the co-location problem of couples more severe if both partners work.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Female Income in DK -0.0113 -0.0179 -0.0149 -0.0284
(0.0568) (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0570)
Log Male Income in DK 0.124** 0.109** 0.0982* 0.0931*
(0.0544) (0.0537) (0.0550) (0.0558)
Power couple -0.0345 -0.0368 -0.0487
(0.0709) (0.0708) (0.0731)
Female power couple 0.00139 0.00431 0.00431
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Male power couple 0.169** 0.162* 0.151*
(0.0825) (0.0829) (0.0855)
Child in DK 0.0470 0.0572
(0.0536) (0.0537)
Female worked in DK 0.244
(0.164)
Observations 449 449 449 449
Notes: OLS estimation. Constant included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 2.5: Linear probability regressions: Stronger male preferences towards joint emigration.
The sample at hand allows to test some predictions from the theoretical model directly. Theory
focuses on partners’ job opportunities among dual career couples. Referring to this, we restrict
the sample in the subsequent analysis to dual-earner couples5. The model yields predictions on
the probability for a partner being a tied mover conditional on joint emigration. We observe only
couples that emigrated together and interpret the stated preferences of the survey respondents as
an indicator for the tied mover status of a partner. Again, we focus on stronger male preferences
5In dual-earner couples, both partners work in the labor market more than 60% of the full working time in the
year before emigration.
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towards emigration as an indicator for female tied mover status.
Results regarding migration preferences among dual-earner couples are in line with the model pre-
dictions. Relatively stronger preferences towards emigration of the male partner are more frequent
in case female income is lower; in contrast to Table 2.5 there are no statistically significant results
for male income among dual-earner couples. We also include a regressor for the presence of children
distinguishing between families with the youngest child below the age of 7 and those in which the
youngest child is 7 or older. Results show that stronger preferences of the male partner to emi-
grate are slightly more frequent if the youngest child was older than 6 before emigration. Related
to the theoretical model the presence of children, on the one hand might increase migration cost
(Mincer, 1978). From the model we were not able to derive a clear prediction on how an increase
in migration costs for both partners would affect the probability for one partner to become a tied
mover conditional on joint emigration. On the other hand, the presence of children could also be
interpreted as an indicator for higher household surplus, making separation more costly for both
partners. In this case, we would expect children in the household to increase the probability of one
partner becoming a tied mover, given that the couple emigrates. Another possible proxy variable
for household surplus h in the model could be relationship length. We include an indicator variable
for whether the couple lived together already 5 years prior to migration in Denmark. Results show
that including this variable goes along with relatively stronger male preferences towards emigra-
tion after controlling for earnings and children in the household. The effect of the child dummy
variable becomes insignificant in the last column. Table B2 in the appendix provides an alternative
specification restricting the sample of dual-earner couples to male primary earners. That model
includes log household income and log earnings difference between primary and secondary earner
confirming the estimation results presented in Table 2.5.
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(1) (2) (3)
Log female income in DK -0.126** -0.103** -0.110***
(0.0523) (0.0546) (0.0544)
Log male income in DK 0.00883 0.0314 0.0514
(0.0475) (0.0500) (0.0506)
Child 0-6 in DK 0.0339 0.0153
(0.0358) (0.0375)
Child 7+ in DK 0.104* 0.0664
(0.0639) (0.0662)
Cohabiting 5+ years in DK 0.0771**
(0.0332)
Observations 235 235 235
R-squared 0.031 0.027 0.040
Notes: OLS estimation. Constant included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 2.6: Linear probability regressions: Stronger male preferences towards joint emigration,
dual-earner couples.
2.6 Conclusion
To shed more light on the determinants of relative migration preferences among the partners in
migrating dual career couples, we developed a model for family bargaining on international migra-
tion. Most of the previous literature has only considered unitary decision-making of households in
the context of migration. Our model endogenizes family stability and explains why a tied mover
might face utility losses through migration, but still migrate with the family. From this framework
we derive predictions on how the probability of becoming a tied mover, and thus rather preferring
not to migrate, is related to earnings of partners in dual-earner couples. We are able to test the
hypotheses with survey data on Danish couples having jointly emigrated.
Empirically, we found that among the partners emigration is mostly a shared preference. How-
ever, in many couples the partners did have different preferences towards joint emigration. Despite
Denmark being one of the most gender-equal countries worldwide, with a high female labor force
participation rate, we found that family migration is more often driven by the male partner. If
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there was disagreement on the migration decision, it was mostly the male who preferred to emi-
grate and the female who would have rather stayed in Denmark. Gender differences in migration
preferences were less strong among couples having migrated to one of the Nordic countries.
Regression analysis shows that an increase in earnings of the male partner in Denmark is asso-
ciated with higher probability that the male has the stronger preference towards emigration in
the couple. This supports our theoretical predictions. Furthermore, we considered the partners
emigration preferences in the light of the couples’ power types in our analysis, i.e. their levels of
education. Our analysis revealed that stronger male preferences towards migration are more fre-
quent among male power couples, in which only the male partner is college educated. Low power
couples, female power couples and power couples do not differ much from each other in terms of
migration preferences.
For the sample of dual-earner couples we are able to directly test the hypotheses derived from the
theoretical bargaining framework. Among these couples, lower female earnings are associated with
stronger preferences of the male partner towards emigration. This is in line with theory. More-
over, we find that stronger male preferences to emigration are more likely in case the couple was
cohabiting for more than 5 years in Denmark, indicating that family migration with a tied mover
is more likely if household surplus is large. Our study provides novel insights on couples’ migration
decisions in case both partners have divergent individual labor market opportunities from migra-
tion. Our empirical analysis is able to confirm theoretical implications from a bargaining model
on migration decisions, a more general framework compared to a unitary household model.
Chapter 3
Family Return Migration
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of family ties for return migration of immigrant couples. A
major part of migration flows to OECD countries is of temporary nature (Dustmann 1995, 1997;
Dustmann and Görlach, 2016). The effect of family ties on migration decision has been studied
both theoretically as well as empirically (Mincer, 1978; Mont, 1989; Borjas and Bronars, 1992;
Tenn, 2010; Gemici, 2011; Junge et al., 2014). As for the initial emigration decision in the first
place, family ties can be expected to also play an important role for the decision to return home
(Dustmann, 2003). However, the role of the family for temporary migration decisions has only
received limited attention so far. There exists an extensive literature focusing on migrants’ ties to
the home country when family members were left behind (For a survey see Docquier and Rapoport,
2006). In contrast to this literature, this chapter analyzes joint migration decisions of partners
who immigrate together and decide whether to jointly return to the country of origin. In this con-
text there is only little evidence on family related considerations for return migration so far. The
present analysis is going to use administrative data from 1973 to 2010 to study return decisions
of immigrant couples living in Denmark. Return plans are likely to affect outcomes on the family
level like fertility and labor market attachment of partners challenging empirical identification of
causal mechanisms. Many observable characteristics that potentially influence family return deci-
sions are endogenously determined.
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This study’s contribution is threefold. First, it improves on causally identifying family related con-
siderations, in particular towards children in the household for the decision of immigrant couples
to return home. The analysis restricts attention to partners having jointly immigrated from the
same country of origin to Denmark. Building on an analysis by Dustmann (2003), who studies
out-migration of guest workers from Germany, the empirical strategy exploits variation in return
propensities between couples with sons versus daughters. Using administrative data for Denmark
and linking information on both partners as well as their children on the household level, this study
adds to the analysis by Dustmann in two ways: First, it confirms findings for the case of Denmark,
and second, it identifies an effect of gender of the first born child in the family. Dustmann analyzed
differences in immigrants’ return propensities according to the share of daughters in the house-
hold. Addressing the concern that the overall number of daughters compared to sons living in the
household might be affected by endogenous fertility decisions, my results reveal that couples from
non-Western countries exhibit relatively higher return propensities when having a girl compared
to a son as a first born child in Denmark. In line with findings by Dustmann (2003) for return mi-
grants from Germany, this effect is statistically significant for the subsample of Turkish immigrants.
In a further step, the present analysis investigates the effect of a policy change in Denmark in
2002 on return migration of immigrant couples. The Danish government tightened rules for family
reunification impeding immigration on the grounds of marriage to a person residing in Denmark
below the age of 24. Even though not affected by the policy change themselves, couples from
non-Western countries are more likely to return after family reunification rules were tightened.
Being statistically significant only for those couples with children this finding suggests that con-
siderations related to home country ties through marriage prospects of children might influence
the return decisions of these couples.
The second contribution relates to potential explanatory channels driving the return decisions of
families. The analysis disentangles heterogeneity in family return rates along different dimen-
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sions and relates this to potential explanatory factors. Descriptive evidence shows that return
propensities of families are very heterogeneous depending on the immigrant couples’ countries of
origin. Coming from one of the other Nordic countries goes along with higher return rates while
return rates are lower in case of the other Western countries and lowest for the non-Western ori-
gin countries. This confirms findings by Jensen and Pedersen (2007) who study out-migration
of immigrants in Denmark and also report large differences for individuals from different sending
country groups. Moreover, the data show that the presence of children is related to return rates
for couples from different countries in a very heterogeneous way. In general, having children and
also the number of children is negatively associated with return propensities, but only statistically
significant for families from the non-Western countries. Couples from all origin countries are less
likely to return with children born in Denmark compared to children born in the country of origin,
controlling for years since immigration.
Further analysis reveals, that families are statistically significantly more likely to return before
school age of the oldest child, if born outside Denmark. This holds for couples from the Nordic
countries, the other Western countries and the non-Western countries. Dustmann (2003) and
Djadjic (2008) argue that labor market perspectives of children have an influence on the parents’
decision whether or not to return. Related to this, schooling considerations might play an im-
portant role, too. Even though the quality of schooling in Denmark is high compared to many
non-Western countries, families might be relatively more likely to return to a country of origin
where education perspectives for the children are better. Tiebout (1956) already suggests that
individuals choose where to live depending on their policy preferences; the provision and quality of
public schools might be one factor associated with location preferences of families. Results reveal
that return migration when the oldest child is below the age of 7 is more likely to countries where
average schooling quality is better, measured along the PISA test score scale. However, variation
in log GDP per capita contributes even more to explaining relatively higher return propensities
of couples with young children. This suggests that other factors correlated with the income level
and institutional quality in the country of origin play a role for return decisions of couples with
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children, too. Overall, the timing of family return decisions suggests an association with the chil-
dren’s schooling. Nevertheless, robust evidence for the link between schooling quality and return
migration of families cannot be established here.
Factors related to home country ties, e.g. cultural identity might also have an effect on the de-
cisions of families to return even among migrants that migrated together with their partner and
children to Denmark. Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) study the impact of cul-
tural identity among immigrants as well as their descendants and find that economic decisions
of first and even second generation immigrants in the host society are strongly associated with
cultural background. This is likely to also affect the propensity to return. Sajons (2015) studies
children’s eligibility to citizenship and return migration of families from Germany. Eligibility to
host country citizenship is found to reduce return rates possibly through considerations related to
the identity. The present analysis provides evidence that factors related to culture and identity are
likely to be relevant for return decisions among subgroups of immigrant couples from Denmark as
well: Relatively higher return probabilities for Turkish immigrants with a girl compared to those
with a boy as the oldest child suggest an effect of considerations related to parents’ preferences
towards gender roles and identity. Given that Denmark is a host country with high female labor
force participation rates and high quality of schooling and a gender equal society, it seems unlikely
that the differences in relative return propensities are due to labor market or schooling considera-
tions concerning daughters in the family. Moreover, the effect of a policy change regarding family
reunification rules also suggests that arguments related to cultural identity and ties to the home
country which are not related to education or institutional quality are relevant for return decisions
of families.
The third contribution of this study links to the literature on temporary migration studying immi-
grants’ self-selection into return migration on labor market characteristics. The present analysis
studies self-selection into return on observable characteristics of the partners, in particular labor
income, separately for all couples, for dual-earner couples, for couples with children and by different
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countries of origin. First of all, results reveal strong self-selection into return migration on primary
earner’s income for couples with male as well as female primary earner. Self-selection patterns are
strongest for non-Western countries. These results are in line with the literature on return mi-
gration, in general, without addressing the role of family ties. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) argue
that the self-selection into return-migration accentuates selection patterns of the initial migration
flow between two countries. Along these lines, Denmark, with a narrow income distribution would
attract relatively more immigrants at the low end of the income distribution (Pedersen, 2005). In
line with theory, self-selection patterns of returning migrant couples according to primary earner
income is strongly positive to non-Western countries where incomes are often more unequally dis-
tributed. Positive self-selection of immigrants into out-migration has also been shown for the case
of Norway (Longva, 2001). For Sweden, Nekby (2006) finds U-shaped selection patterns with pos-
itive self-selection of immigrants into return migration at the upper end of the income distribution.
Extending the literature regarding individual self-selection into return migration with a house-
hold level perspective can provide additional insights on how family ties shape decision making
on return migration. In general, families migrating together often have to overcome co-location
problems due to different individual migration incentives between the partners. Thus partners ex-
perience unequal labor market gains from migration and one partner often becomes a tied mover
(Mincer, 1978). While family ties have generally been found to reduce mobility (Mincer, 1978;
Frank, 1978), the effect of family ties on self-selection patterns regarding individual characteristics
of the partners are less clear. Junge et al. (2014) show that self-selection for emigrant couples
from Denmark according to primary earner’s income is stronger than self-selection patterns for
singles. Borjas and Bronars (1992), on the other hand, find weaker self-selection of immigrants
with family ties into the US. They argue that family migrants are selected more randomly as they
are more likely not to migrate primarily due to own income incentives. Co-location problems and
divergent individual gains from migration might also affect return decisions from the host country.
The effects to expect related to family ties of migrants and the partners’ self-selection into return
migration on labor market characteristics are not clear ex-ante though.
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Analysis shows that individual and family characteristics of both partners contribute to explaining
joint return propensities. Either partner being out of the labor force is associated with higher
joint return propensities for immigrant couples from the Nordic, the other Western as well as the
non-Western countries. Moreover, the positive correlation between higher propensity to return and
higher income of the primary earner is lower among dual-earner couples in which both partners
work more than 60% of full working time in the labor market. This finding is driven by immigrant
couples from the non-Western countries. On top of this, the presence of children also seems to
affect self-selection on primary earner’s income into return migration. Results, which are again
driven by the non-Western sending countries, show that the children in the household weaken self-
selection into return migration on primary earner income. A possible explanation for this is that
other factors that play a role for return migration of families with children, which are uncorrelated
with primary earner income, reduce selection patterns compared to singles and to couples without
children.
As outlined, the following analysis is going to show along different dimensions how family con-
siderations are related to return migration decisions of immigrant couples. For policy makers it
is of utmost importance to understand return decisions of immigrants in order to design policies
aiming at attracting and retaining immigrants to overcome skill shortages, demographic challenges
and to foster economic growth. To this, the present analysis shows that considerations related to
the family play an important role and have to be taken into account in this context. The rest of
the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on immigration to
Denmark and introduces the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents stylized facts
and descriptive statistics, section 4 econometric analysis and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The Danish administrative data contains information on all registered immigrants living in Den-
mark in a given year. According to the definition of Statistics Denmark a person is considered as
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immigrant if he or she was born outside Denmark and none of the parents has Danish citizenship.
The same applies in case the citizenship status of the parents is unknown to the authorities.1 Ac-
cording to this definition the total number of immigrants living in Denmark in 2005 was 542,738,
corresponding to 9.8% of the resident population. Table 3.1 shows that 7.5% of immigrants liv-
ing in Denmark in year 2005 originate from another Nordic country, mostly from Sweden (3.5%)
and Norway (3.2%); a minor share of migrants comes from Finland (0.6%) and Iceland (0.2%).
During the whole analysis migrants from Faroe Islands or Greenland will be excluded as these are
autonomous regions of Denmark. In particular, Sweden and Denmark have a long history of high
bilateral migration flows as migration costs between these countries are low given the geographic
as well as cultural proximity. Formally, there has been free mobility between the Nordic countries
since 1954 (Nannestad, 2004). Since 1993 individuals from countries that are part of the European
common market, like Denmark, can move freely between these countries without having to apply
for visa or work permits. As for citizens from these countries working and living in Denmark
became possible without any legal restrictions, immigration to Denmark increased subsequently
(Jensen and Pedersen, 2007). Table 3.1 shows that 13.1% of immigrants living in Denmark in
2005 are from a Western European sending country. There are 2.2% of immigrants from Australia,
Canada, New Zealand or the United States.
Immigration to Denmark from many non-EU countries is very restricted. Major immigration chan-
nels from non-Western countries are due to asylum policies and family reunification. The major
sending countries for asylum seekers in Denmark over the considered time period were Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon and the Balkan countries. These major refugee sending countries
make up in total 34.6% of the immigrant population in 2005, but will be excluded in the subse-
quent analysis as migration and return considerations are likely to be different compared with other
countries. Excluding the refugee sending countries, migrants from non-Western countries account
for the remaining 42.6% of the immigrant population in 2005; the biggest group among them are
Turkish immigrants with a share of 12.2%. Most immigrants from Turkey entered Denmark as so-
1Further information is available at https://cpr.dk/in-english/moving-from-denmark/, https://cpr.dk/in-
english/moving-to-denmark/.
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called guest workers before the 1980s or later through family reunification programs (Nannestad,
2004). Even though many of the initial guest workers returned home after the recruitment policies
had ended, many also stayed and made use of the possibility for family reunification in Denmark
(Böhning, 1984).
Origin
Nordic countries 7.5%
Other Western countries 15.3%
Other W.European countries 13.1%
AUS, CAN, NZ, US 2.2%
Non-Western countries 77.2%
Turkey 12.2 %
Major refugee sending countries 34.6 %
Remaining countries 30.4 %
Total 542,738
Table 3.1: Immigrant population in Denmark, 2005.
The data used in the subsequent analysis come from the Danish administrative population, tax,
and migration registers. For a given year the records contain basic demographic characteristics,
and labor market related information, as well as data on immigration and emigration events for
each individual. The analysis is going to pool data on individual characteristics from these sources
for immigrants in Denmark over the cross section years from 1981 to 2005. Individual characteris-
tics are linked with migration data for each year indicating whether an individual enters or leaves
the country as well as from or to which respective sending or destination country. Registering
immigration and emigration is compulsory in Denmark. As soon as a person leaves the country
for more than six months he or she is required by law to report the emigration country and the
date of emigration to the authorities in Denmark. These officially registered migration events are
going to be used throughout the following analysis. The migration register contains information on
immigrations and emigrations from 1973 to 2010 for all individuals in the population at any point
in time since 1981. For the most part of the analysis attention will be restricted to immigrants
who came to Denmark at earliest in 1973 and at latest in 2005, are in the population data in any
year between 1981 and 2005 and stayed for at least one year.
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The sample will be restricted to individuals who are between 25 and 59 in order to capture the
working age immigrant population. Furthermore, individuals have to be at least 18 when immi-
grating; this ensures that they most probably migrated for own reasons to Denmark and did not
come as children with the family. The major part of the empirical analysis restricts attention to a
sub-sample of immigrants with a partner from the same country both fulfilling the age restriction
above. Return behavior of couples with partners from different countries of origin is likely to be
qualitatively different and should be analyzed separately, which is beyond the scope of this study.
Unique individual and family identifiers make it possible to combine data for cohabiting partners
as well as their children while they reside in Denmark.2 In order to allow for the possibility of
sequential immigration of spouses (Borjas and Bronars, 1992), both partners do not necessarily
need to have immigrated in the same year to Denmark. However, to be included in the analysis
the partners have to cohabit immediately after the second mover immigrated.
A return event in the subsequent analysis is defined as emigrating from Denmark to the country of
origin. A couple returns if both partners migrate to their country of origin within the same year.
Couples and singles are observed in the administrative registers over the observation period every
year as long as their cohabitation status remains the same and as long as they reside in Denmark.
Return migration patterns of couple households will be studied with respect to partner- and family
characteristics and also be compared to single migrants. Returners and non-returners will be com-
pared based on observable characteristics in the year before the potential return migration event.
Results for returning to the country of origin in the following analysis are reported for returners
not re-entering Denmark for the subsequent 5 years.
2Immigrants linked with a partner are either cohabiting at the same address, married or in a registered part-
nership according to the administrative registers. Individuals in registered same-sex partnerships will be excluded
because the number of observations is low in the immigrant population.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 presents the data of the analyzed sample with the mentioned restrictions according to the
origin countries of the migrants, separately for couples and singles. There are 318,377 individual-
year pairs for male single migrants and 231,571 individual-year pairs for female single migrants
in the data. There are 358,920 observations for individuals with a partner from the same coun-
try of origin. According to the restrictions above in total 9,214 return events of couples can be
observed. There are differences between the shares of the sending countries for singles and part-
ners presented in Table 3.2. For Western countries the share of migrants in single households is
higher than for migrants with a partner from the same country of origin. 5.2% of couples are from
another Nordic country and 16.5% from one of the remaining Western countries. Among single
males and females the corresponding shares are considerably higher. On the other hand, 78.3%
of couple migrants are from the non-Western origin countries, compared to 47.2% among single
males and 54.0% among single female. In particular for couple households in this group excluding
the major refugee sending countries the most important sending country is Turkey (share of 29.6%).
Singles Partners from
males females same origin country
Other Nordic countries 14.2 19.9 5.2
Other Western countries 38.5 26.0 16.5
Western Europe 33.8 22.1 14.8
US, NZ, CAN, AUS 4.7 3.9 1.7
Non Western countries 47.2 54.0 78.3
Turkey 7.6 5.7 29.6
Remaining countries 39.6 48.3 48.7
Observations 318,377 231,571 358,920
Source: Administrative data.
Table 3.2: Origin countries.
Table 3.3 reveals that return propensities of single and couple migrants differ considerably accord-
ing to the country of origin. Among singles as well as couples from the non-Western countries
returns to the home country are least frequent (2% for couples, 4% for single females and 7% for
single males) while they are more likely for those from other Western countries (10% among all
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groups) and most likely for those from other Nordic countries (18% for couples, 10% for female
singles and 13% for male singles). In particular for couples returns are most frequent to the other
Nordic countries while much less frequent among those from the non-Western countries. Of course,
the average duration of stay varies between the different origin country groups, with migrant sin-
gles as well as couples from Western European countries having on average shorter duration of stay
than those from the non-Western countries. Potential reasons which might in general explain dif-
ferences in temporary migration patterns between immigrants from the considered sending country
groups are going to be addressed later. Due to the heterogeneity between the different countries of
origin, much of the subsequent analysis is going to distinguish three groups of sending and return
countries of migrants: The first group are other Nordic countries, the second group other Western
countries consisting of the non-Nordic, Western European countries as well as Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the United States. Non-Western countries are the third group accounting ac-
cording to observations in the data for a majority among couples as well as single migrants.
Table 3.3 presents further average sample characteristics separately for singles and couples in the
data. Females in couples are on average slightly younger while males are slightly older than in the
corresponding sample of singles. Table 3.3 also reports the share of couples with children. With
78% a large fraction of couples has children below the age of 16 in the household.3 Children are
also present in 33% of single female and 10% of single male migrant households. The income and
tax register data provide information on labor market activity of the immigrant population in Den-
mark. Table 3.3 shows that 23% of single men and women are out of the labor force in the sample.
This share is higher among females in couples (33%), but lower among male partners (14%). The
share of self-employed is relatively small in all groups. 44% of single men and 46% of single women
work in the labor market, 30% of males and 31% of females in full-time employment.4 The share
of employed is lower among females in couples (32%, full-time: 21%) and higher among males
(49%, full-time: 38%). The share of couples in which both partners work full-time in the labor
market is only 15%. The income register data reports annual gross labor and freelance income
3Older children are not directly recorded as household members and thus left out of the analysis.
4Full-time employment is defined as working more than 60% of the full-time equivalent working time in a given
year.
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Couples,
partners from
Singles same origin country
males females males females
Age 37.4 38.3 40.6 37.2
Children in household 0.10 0.33 0.78
Out of labor force 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.33
Self employed 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.06
Employment 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.32
Full time employment 0.30 0.31 0.38 0.21
Dual-earner couples 0.15
Full-time average annual earnings 237,724 212,792 244,325 237,724
Returns events:
Other Nordic countries 0.13 0.10 0.18
Other Western countries 0.10 0.10 0.10
Western Europe 0.09 0.09 0.08
US, NZ, CAN, AUS 0.14 0.13 0.18
Non Western countries 0.07 0.04 0.02
Turkey 0.02 0.01 0.01
Remaining countries 0.08 0.05 0.02
Source: Administrative data.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics.
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for each individual. Table 3.3 shows average values in Danish Krone for the sum of both earnings
from employment and non-negative freelance income. These are calculated only for individuals
who work full-time. Average earnings are higher among males as well as females in the group of
couples compared with single households.
Figure 3.1: Return migration propensities in percent according to age of oldest child.
Among the immigrant couples Table 3.3 has revealed a high share of households in which children
are present. For these couples Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the age of the oldest
child under 16 and the return propensity to the country of origin. The illustration distinguishes
between the case in which the oldest child was born abroad or in Denmark. Data for singles
with children are not presented and analyzed further as migration decisions of single individuals
with children might very likely be related to family members or a partner living abroad, e.g. in
long-distance relationships. To account for some of the heterogeneity between the return rates of
migrants from the origin country groups described above, which might also be related to the pres-
ence of children in the household, the graphs in Panel A refer to couples from Western countries
and in Panel B to non-Western countries. Figure 3.1 shows that couples from Western as well as
from non-Western countries are more likely to return at any age of the oldest child in case it was
not born in Denmark. The graphs provide descriptive evidence that couples with young children
in the household are more likely to return than couples with older children. In general, as seen
from Table 3.3, couples from Western countries have much higher return propensities than couples
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from the non-Western countries. Returns are most likely either when the children are very young,
or are shortly before school age which starts at the age of 7 in Denmark.5 In particular, for chil-
dren born before immigration, the graphs show a kink and sharply decreasing return propensities
between the ages 5 to 7. Of course, ommitted variables are likely to influence these patterns, too.
Analysis in the following section will additionally control for confounding factors like the years
since immigration and further characteristics of the parents and will as well consider differences
between return countries in more detail. Moreover, fertility decisions are likely to be linked to
return plans. Subsequent regression analysis will address the question of causality between the
presence of children and return migration.
Another question of interest when analyzing return migration in the family context is whether
and how partners’ individual characteristics are related to the probability to self-select into return
migration. As for the relationship between earnings and return migration, Figure 3.2 shows stan-
dardized annual earnings of the primary earner among couples in which the primary earner works
more than 60% of full working time in the labor market. The other partner is either employed, out
of the labor force or unemployed. Self-employed are excluded as the income data does not provide
reliable earnings information for self-employed persons. Log-standardized earnings are calculated
by taking logs of a standardized earnings measure which is constructed following Borjas et al.
(2015): An individual’s annual gross labor income is divided by the average gross earnings of the
whole population also working 60% or more in the same age and gender group during a given cal-
endar year. Put differently, comparing standardized earnings accounts for the composition effects
in the considered immigrant population with respect to age and year separately for males and
females. Log-standardized earnings distributions in Figure 3.2 are only presented for the primary
earner working more than 60% of full working time in a given year, in Panel A for male primary
earners and in Panel B for female primary earners.
The top row compares primary earners’ annual log-standardized earnings for returning and non-
returning couples. For male as well as for female primary earners the returners’ distributions
5For further information see https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=133039#K2
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almost first order dominate the distributions of the non-returners showing a strong positive self-
selection into return-migration on the income of the primary earner. Figure C1 in the appendix
reveals that positive selection is stronger for immigrants from the non-Western countries than for
those from the Western countries. An interesting question is whether the presence of children
in the household is related to these selection patterns on primary earner’s income. The second
row restricts the sample to couples with children below the age of 16 in the household. The
distributional dominance appears to be slightly weaker, but, overall, no strong differences to the
distribution functions above can be observed neither for male nor for female primary earners. At
the bottom row the distribution functions for dual-earner couples are shown.6 Here, selection on
primary earner’s standardized earnings is still positive, at least for the upper part of the distri-
bution. However, the patterns are weaker compared with the graphs in the top row. Of course
the presented differences between primary earners’ incomes of returning and non-returning couples
as well as the differences when restricting to dual-earner couples might be due to other omitted
characteristics. For example, underlying heterogeneity in the duration of stay and the composition
of the considered groups, e.g. with regard to countries of origin could play an important role.
These issues will be addressed in the regression analysis.
Borjas (1987) argues that immigrants from origin countries with a more unequal distribution of
incomes migrating to destinations where incomes are distributed more equally tend to earn less,
on average, than the native population in the destination country. This is because those from the
lower end of a dispersed income distribution gain most and have the strongest incentives to migrate
to a country with a more narrow distribution of incomes, given that returns to skills between the
two countries are to a sufficient extent positively correlated. Referring to couple migrants, Fig-
ure C1 reveals relatively lower standardized earnings for male and female primary earners when
comparing immigrant couples from non-Western countries where incomes are generally distributed
more unequally with those from the Nordic countries and from other Western countries with nar-
rower income distributions.7 This is in line with theoretical predictions.
6Among dual-earner couples the sample restriction requires that both partners are employed and work more
than 60%.
7Klugman (2011) presents a ranking of countries showing that Western and in particular Nordic countries have
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative distribution functions for log-standardized earnings.
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Along the same lines the findings regarding selection into return migration shown in Figure 3.2
and C1 confirm considerations outlined by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) regarding the self-selection
of immigrants into return migration. Borjas and Bratsberg argue that temporary migration, and
the self-selection into return migration, accentuates the initial selection of immigrants migrating
from one country to another with respect to the distribution of earnings. Return migration in-
centives are driven by the same mechanism as in Borjas (1987) working in the opposite direction
and intensifying the selection of the migrants having arrived from a particular destination country.
Among migrants from countries where there is negative selection with respect to earnings in the
host country, those with relatively higher earnings are more likely to return. According to this,
immigrants in Denmark with a relatively high level of education and high earnings potential would
be most likely to leave. Theory would predict this selection into return migration to be particularly
strong among immigrants coming from countries with a relatively wide income distribution which
is also in line with descriptive evidence presented in Figure C1. An alternative hypothesis to which
immigrants who have lower earnings due to a bad job realization would return to their country of
origin, cannot be confirmed with the data.
At the family level Figure 3.2 indicates a weaker selection on primary earner’s income into return
migration for dual-earner couples, in which both partners work in the labor market more than 60%.
Borjas and Bronars (1992) argue that family ties weaken self-selection into migration on individ-
ual earnings as the labor market characteristics of an accompanying family member are different
from those of the one who initiates the move. A potential explanation for a weaker self-selection
on the primary earner’s income might be conflicting individual migration interests resulting in a
co-location problem if both spouses are in the labor market. This argument has been applied and
empirically confirmed for internal migration in the United States (Costa and Kahn, 2000) as well as
in the international context for emigration decisions of couples (Borjas and Bronars, 1992); a priori
it is an open question how self-selection into joint return migration of partners will be affected by
labor market considerations on the household level. The co-location problem outlined in the family
relatively low levels of inequality in the distribution of disposable incomes as indicated by the GINI coefficent.
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migration literature might as well apply to return migration. Coordination on whether and when
to return becomes more difficult if both partners’ incentives are not perfectly correlated across
locations. And selection on primary earner’s income might be stronger if the migration decision in
a couple has to take into account career opportunities and location preferences of the secondary
earner to a lesser extent then reflecting the optimal decision from the primary earner’s perspective.
Along the same lines also the presence of children could weaken self-selection into return migration
according to primary earner’s income: Factors related to children might be important for the re-
turn decision of parents as suggestive evidence in Figure 3.1 indicates. This would explain slightly
weaker self-selection pattern related to income of the primary earner. However, there is not strong
evidence confirming this conjecture in Figure 3.2.
3.4 Econometric Analysis
In the econometric analysis different versions of the following linear probability model are estimated
on the sample described above.
Mab,t+1 = β0 + β1Xab,t + β2Y SMa,t + β3Y SMb,t +D.Imm.Agea +D.Imm.Ageb +D.t+ uab,t,
where each observation in year t refers to a couple ab with partners a and b. Mab,t+1 is a binary
indicator for a joint return event in the following period. Moreover, it is required that neither part-
ner re-migrates to Denmark during the subsequent five years. Non-parametric controls for life- and
business-cycle effects are included with dummy variables for age at immigration of each individual
and for the corresponding cross-section calendar years. Furthermore, the regressors Y SMa,t and
Y SMb,t capture the years since immigration for each individual. The vector Xab,t summarizes
observable individual and family related characteristics which will be introduced in more detail
later. The above equation is also estimated for single households to compare the response of return
propensities to observable characteristics between singles and couples. Naturally, in that speci-
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fication only the corresponding individual level control variables for one single person are included.
The analysis covers return events of immigrants who reside in Denmark between 1981 and 2005.
As immigrants are included who entered Denmark between 1973 and 2005 the sample year 1981
already contains a stock of migrants living in Denmark up to eight years. Starting with a stock
of immigrants oversamples those in the population who stay longer in the host country (see Rid-
der , 1984). On the other hand, however, this allows to also to include migrants having entered
Denmark between 1973 and 1981 into the analysis. Moreover, a potential estimation bias might
arise due to censoring of the data because some couples drop out of the sample as time passes
by due to separation. Analysis addressing this concern will be part of a future extension to the
presented results. The main estimation results from the regression models will be reported for
the pooled sample of immigrants as well as separately for the three main country-of-origin groups
described above: Immigrants from other Nordic countries, those from the other Western countries,
and those from the non-Western countries. Results presented in this section are estimated with
OLS, standard errors being clustered at the household level.
3.4.1 Children and Return Migration
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.3 showed that there is a large fraction of immigrant
couples with children in the household. Moreover, Figure 3.1 illustrated that most couples who
return to the home country and have children seem to do so while the oldest child is relatively
young, in particular while still being below school age. Return rates for couples with the first child
born abroad are considerably higher than in case the child was born in Denmark.
However, the descriptive patterns might be affected by unobserved factors which are not controlled
for so far. Regression analysis in Table 3.4 studies in more detail the relationship between the num-
ber of children in immigrant couples’ households and return migration propensities controlling for
the set of characteristics described above. Additionally, information on whether both partners
participate in the labor force are included in the specifications. The results as presented in Table
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3.4 are comparable to the analysis in Dustmann (2003) studying return decisions of migrant guest
worker families from Germany. Estimations for the pooled sample as well as separately by im-
migrant country groups show that both partners’ years since migration are negatively associated
with the probability to leave Denmark. Moreover, being out of the labor force goes along with
higher return propensities for both partners. Controlling linearly for the number of children below
the age of 16 in the household indicates that having more children in the household is correlated
with lower return propensities. This is in line with results found by Dustmann for return migrants
from Germany. In general, the literature on family migration argues that children in the household
reduce mobility of couples because of higher costs to migrate (e.g. Mincer, 1978; Gemici, 2011).
The relationship between the number of children and returning to the home country is statistically
insignificant for the Nordic sending countries and other Western countries, though. A negative
coefficient sign is estimated statistically significant for non-Western countries.
However, migration and fertility choices are likely to be jointly determined. A potential solution
to this endogeneity problem is proposed by Dustmann (2003): Parents’ preferences towards their
offspring’s future labor market activity might depend on the gender of the child and they might
thus invest differently in human capital for boys than for girls. This could then also affect re-
turn propensities being related to the earnings perspectives of the children in the destination and
home country. Comparing different return propensities between families with daughters and sons
is used to present evidence for a causal effect on return migration arguing that the share of sons
and daughters in the household is exogenously determined. Dustmann finds that more daughters
given the total number of children in the family increase out-migration propensities among Turkish
immigrant families. The Danish data show, in line with those results, that families from Turkey
having more daughters than sons are statistically significantly more likely to return. The coeffi-
cient for the number of daughters is statistically significant at the 5% level for the Turkish couples.
In terms of coefficient size couples with more daughters than sons are overall less likely to return
than couples without children, but return propensities with a given number of daughters in the
family are estimated to be relatively higher compared to parents having the same number of sons.
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Non-Western
Other countries
All All Nordic Western Remaining
countries countries countries countries Turkey countries
Number of children -0.0046*** -0.0050*** -0.0064 -0.0034 -0.0011*** -0.0038***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0074) (0.0032) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Number of daughters 0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0019 0.0007** 0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0112) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0007)
Male out of LF 0.0440*** 0.0446*** 0.0547*** 0.0870*** 0.0254*** 0.0272***
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0115) (0.0072) (0.0030) (0.0014)
Female out of LF 0.0254*** 0.0264*** 0.0495*** 0.0562*** 0.0053*** 0.0245***
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0141) (0.0047) (0.0008) (0.0025)
Yrs since imm. male -0.0022*** -0.0023*** -0.0056*** -0.0025*** -0.0004*** -0.0017***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0006) (8.54e-05) (9.49e-05)
Yrs since imm. female -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0082*** -0.0022*** -0.0001* -0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0006) (7.77e-05) (8.27e-05)
Dummy variables
Female age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,046 141,046 6,034 19,417 45,871 69,724
R-squared 0.0553 0.0553 0.0976 0.0553 0.03 0.043
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.4: Linear probability regressions: Family return to origin country.
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The corresponding coefficient estimate for the number of daughters is statistically insignificant
for couples from the other country groups, with a positive sign for the remaining non-Western
countries and a negative sign for other Nordic and Western countries.
A potential threat to causal identification in the analysis using the number of children and daugh-
ters in Table 3.4 might be that having more daughters than sons could already be an endogenous
outcome. Earlier literature has documented economic effects of a so-called son-preference in coun-
tries like India (Tarozzi, 2012; Hu and Schlosser, 2012), China (Ebenstein, 2007) and Turkey
(Arnold and Kuo, 1984). Cultures in these countries might treat sons differently from daughters
when it comes to marriage arrangements and inheritances, for example (Das Gupta et al., 2010).
Affecting parents’ preferences towards having a son or a daughter, this has eventually an effect
on fertility rates, too. Even though immigrants in Denmark are not exposed to the formal and
informal institutional environment of their home countries, potential return plans or cultural back-
ground (Fernandez, 2007) might still have an impact on fertility decisions. In case having more
daughters than sons is directly related to return plans or omitted characteristics affecting return
propensities, the previously presented results might not provide evidence for a causal effect of
children on family returns in the subsample of Turkish immigrants. Further disentangling fertility
decisions and the timing of migration could yield more insights into a causal effect of children on
return migration of families. In the next step, families that immigrated with children born abroad
and those having the first child only when living in Denmark are going to be analyzed separately.
Couples without children are the reference group in the following baseline regression specifications.
Table C1 restricts the sample to parents only. To analyze exogenous variation related to return
propensities depending on exogenous variation of the child’s gender the regression only includes
covariates related to the oldest child apart from the control variables also included in Table 3.4.
A dummy controls for whether the oldest child is born in Denmark and an additional dummy for
whether the child is a girl. Data indicate indeed that for the subsample of Turkish couples having
a girl as the first born child in Denmark is associated with slightly, but statistically significant on
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the 10% level, higher return propensities compared to families in which the first born child is a
boy. Still the overall effect of having a child in Denmark on return propensities is negative also
for girls. There is no empirical evidence for an effect of having a boy or a girl as first child in
Denmark among couples from the other sending country groups. The presented results support
the hypothesis that considerations related to children affect family return decisions from Denmark.
For the subgroup of Turkish immigrant couples causal evidence for gender of the first born child
on return decisions can be established.
Table 3.5 addresses in more detail the timing of return decisions of families in order to explore
potential explanatory factors for return migration with children more closely. To account for the
heterogeneity between families with children born in the home country or in Denmark, the regres-
sions include separate dummy variables for whether the oldest child below 16 in the household was
born in Denmark or abroad. The reference group are couples without children while an additional
control variable captures whether further children still live in the household in case the oldest child
is above 16.
The first specification again indicates for the pooled sample that having children goes along with
lower return propensities compared with the reference group, couples without children. It controls
separately for the oldest child being born in Denmark or born abroad and reveals lower migration
probabilities of couples in both cases. The subsequent specifications control for whether the oldest
child is at most 6 years old or older than 6. capturing the important heterogeneity illustrated in
Figure 3.1. Estimation results for all country groups together reveal that parents with the oldest
child below 7, born abroad are more likely to return than parents whose oldest child was born in
Denmark. The estimated effect on the likelihood to return is statistically significantly positive on
the 1% level even compared to couples without children. The estimated marginal effect on return
probabilities for older children and for children below the age of 7 born in Denmark are statistically
significant negative on the 1% level relative to the reference category, couples without children.
According to the estimation results return probabilities are lowest for children between 7 and 16,
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born in Denmark. Table 3.5 shows that the patterns described above hold very similarly for all
the considered country groups separately. The largest marginal effect for higher return propen-
sities with children born abroad below the age of 7 is estimated for the group of other Nordic
countries. Table C2 provides more detail on the relationship between age of the oldest child and
return propensities by including a full set of child age dummy variables. As seen from results
in Table 3.5 and descriptive evidence given before in Figure 3.1 family return rates are highest
for children born outside Denmark and fall substantially around the time when the oldest child
reaches school age. This indicates that the timing of return for these families might be driven by
schooling considerations. For the oldest child born in Denmark, however, no systematic pattern
related to family return propensities can be established.
Tiebout (1956) already suggests that individuals choose where to live based on their policy prefer-
ences. For parents with children about to enter school the quality of public education in a country
might be an argument in favor or against returning. Analysis presented in Table 3.6 addresses
the question whether schooling quality might influence return decisions of parents. Specification 1
includes standardized average PISA 2012 test score for math in the country of origin as regressor,
interacted with the dummy variable referring to the oldest child as introduced above.8 Results
indicate that parents with children born in the origin country tend to return more frequently to
countries with a higher average score, which can be cautiously interpreted as a proxy for schooling
quality. The model interacts the standardized PISA test score with the dummy variables for the
oldest child born abroad and in Denmark, separately by age group. In line with the argument that
schooling considerations matter most for the returning families with young children, the average
PISA score in the country of origin is positively associated with return propensities in particular for
families in which the oldest child is below 7. These families might view schooling considerations for
8The scaling unit of the PISA 2012 variable are standard deviations from the OECD average PISA score. The cov-
ered OECD and non-OECD countries are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam. For more
information on the PISA 2012 test see OECD (2014) and https://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-
volume-i.htm
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Other Non-
All All Nordic West. West.
countries countr. countries countries countr.
First child born abr. 0-16 -0.00492***
(0.00161)
First child born abr. 0-6 0.0221*** 0.0698*** 0.0222** 0.0131***
(0.00368) (0.0218) (0.00885) (0.00354)
First child born abr. 7-16 -0.0109*** -0.00916 -0.00470 -0.00617***
(0.00159) (0.0130) (0.00518) (0.00140)
First child born in DK 0-16 -0.00586***
(0.00141)
First child born in DK 0-6 -0.00712*** 0.0174 0.00618 -0.00447***
(0.00174) (0.0213) (0.00645) (0.00144)
First child born in DK 7-16 -0.00418*** -0.0581*** -0.000912 -0.00153
(0.00125) (0.0159) (0.00590) (0.00107)
Children <16 in HH -0.00688*** -0.00756*** -0.0112 -0.00215 -0.00452***
when oldest Child >16 (0.00104) (0.00102) (0.0132) (0.00542) (0.000848)
Male out of LF 0.0249*** 0.0247*** 0.0339*** 0.0799*** 0.0118***
(0.00215) (0.00215) (0.0141) (0.00703) (0.00195)
Female out of LF 0.0164*** 0.0156*** 0.0352*** 0.0447*** 0.0127***
(0.00105) (0.00105) (0.0116) (0.00469) (0.000809)
Dummy variables:
Years since imm. male Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years since imm. female Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141,046 141,046 6,034 19,417 115,595
R-squared 0.077 0.079 0.144 0.081 0.060
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.5: Linear probability regressions: Children and family return to origin country.
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their children as most relevant with regard to the return decision. However, the described relation-
ships break down when including the regressor into the country subgroup analysis, indicating that
they are driven by a difference in PISA scores between Western and non-Western sending countries.
Alternatively, and also in line with Tiebout sorting, parents with children could also be more likely
to return rather to wealthier countries in which both schooling and many other public services are
of better quality. Instead of the average PISA score specifications in the second column in Table
3.6 include log GDP per capita in the otherwise similar specification as in the first column. A
higher R-squared value suggests that GDP per capita seems to explain more of the variation than
the first specification. Thus higher return rates of couples with pre-school age children to countries
with better schooling quality seem to be driven by higher per capita income in the destination
countries which is potentially correlated with the quality of many public services of importance
for parents with young children. This makes drawing conclusions from the estimation results in
Table 3.6 regarding higher return propensities to countries with higher average school performance
difficult.
Regression analysis reveals a further interesting insight in family related considerations influenc-
ing return decisions of couples. Table 3.7 presents the coefficient estimates for dummy variables
of a given calendar year from 1998 to 2005. For immigrant couples from non-Western countries
estimates show a statistically significant increase in return propensities for the years after 2002
(reference year: 2001). In 2002, the Danish government implemented an amendment to the Danish
Aliens Act requiring that spouses have to be at least 24 years old in order to apply for spousal
reunification if one of the partners holds a permanent residence permit in Denmark. This so-called
24 year rule was announced in January 2002, passed in June and implemented in July 2002 in
order to reduce incentives for forced marriages. Other research has shown that the introduction of
the law changed immigration of singles from Denmark to Sweden (Bratu, Dahlberg and Engdahl,
2016). According to Swedish administrative data foreign singles living in Denmark and being
between 18 and 24, and thus affected by the new rule, were more likely to move to and settle in
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PISA PISA
countries countries
First child born abroad 0-6 0.0238*** 0.0331***
(0.00507) (0.00698)
First child born abroad 7-16 -0.0111*** -0.0180***
(0.00197) (0.00259)
First child born in DK 0-6 -0.00757*** -0.0187***
(0.00232) (0.00299)
First child born in DK 7-16 -0.00470*** -0.00598***
(0.00164) (0.00215)
PISA 0.00424*** Log GDP per capita (GDP) 1.10e-06***
(0.00126) (7.12e-08)
PISA*First child born abroad 0-6 0.0114* GDP*First child born abroad 0-6 1.99e-06***
(0.00591) (2.31e-07)
PISA*First child born abroad 7-16 -0.00123 GDP*First child born abroad 7-16 3.92e-07***
(0.00211) (1.17e-07)
PISA*First child born in DK 0-6 0.00288 GDP*First child born in DK 0-6 5.67e-07***
(0.00198) (1.55e-07)
PISA*First child born in DK 7-16 0.00122 GDP*First child born in DK 7-16 7.28e-07**
(0.00201) (1.09e-07)
Children <16 in HH -0.00656*** -0.00346***
when oldest child >16 (0.00134) (0.00130)
Male out of LF 0.0283*** 0.0307***
(0.00282) (0.00284)
Female out of LF 0.0206*** 0.0219***
(0.00153) (0.00155)
Dummy variables:
Years since imm. male Yes Yes
Years since imm. female Yes Yes
Female age at imm. Yes Yes
Male age at imm. Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Observations 98,916 98,916
R-squared 0.092 0.144
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.6: Linear probability regressions: Schooling considerations and family return to origin.
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Sweden. Nielsen et al. (2007) find that the implementation of the law reduced school dropouts
among immigrant males between the age of 18 and 23 in Denmark.
Non- Non-
Year All Nordic Other Non- West. ctr. West. ctr.
(Base 2001) countries countries West. ctr. West. ctr. with children no children
1998 0.00251 0.0161 0.00597 0.000727 0.00221 -0.00461
(0.00245) (0.0309) (0.00986) (0.00177) (0.00182) (0.00481)
1999 0.000249 . -0.0333 0.00287 0.000818 0.000461 0.00262
(0.00232) (0.0285) (0.00939) (0.00172) (0.00166) (0.00502)
2000 0.00338 0.0445 0.0150 -0.000834 0.00501 -0.00478
(0.00234) (0.0294) (0.00955) (0.00161) (0.00162) (0.00438)
2002 -0.00170 -0.000557 -0.0170* 0.00128 0.00132 0.000634
(0.00213) (0.0289) (0.00798) (0.00164) (0.00163) (0.00446)
2003 0.00145 -0.0216 -0.00596 0.00426** 0.00534*** 0.00112
(0.00217) (0.0286) (0.00819) (0.00175) (0.00185) (0.00430)
2004 0.00379* 0.0101 -0.00103 0.00397** 0.00461*** 0.00221
(0.00222) (0.0285) (0.00831) (0.00174) (0.00179) (0.00444)
2005 0.00152 -0.0164 0.00525 0.00227 0.00235 0.00191
(0.00219) (0.0281) (0.00831) (0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00449)
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level.
Dummy variables: Yrs since imm. male, Yrs since imm. female, Female age at imm., Male age at imm.,
Male out of LF, Female out of LF, Year, Children in HH. (Col.1-4). Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.7: Linear probability regressions: Year dummy coefficient estimates for return migration.
The results reported in Table 3.7 indicate higher return propensities of couples from non-Western
countries after 2002 when the new law was passed and implemented. This seems surprising at
first hand sight as the analyzed group, cohabiting couples where both partners are between 25 and
59 holding a residence permit in Denmark, is not directly affected by the rule. Two explanations
could be possible in this context. First, the perception of stricter policies towards foreigners might
be an argument to return even for couples in which both partners already reside in Denmark. Or
second, partners might take into account marriage prospects of their children in Denmark. Results
in the last two columns in Table 3.7 reveal, that the increase in return propensities for couples
after 2002 is indeed driven by families with children to non-Western countries. This points into
the direction that considerations related to marriage prospects of these families’ children might be
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relevant in this context.
3.4.2 Earnings, Family Ties and Return Migration
The following analysis restricts attention to couples in which the primary earner works more than
60% of the full working time in the labor market and the other partner is either employed, un-
employed or out of the labor force, excluding the self-employed where no reliable information on
earnings is available. Descriptive evidence suggested that couples returning from Denmark are
positively selected on the primary earner’s log standardized earnings. Figure 3.2 showed that this
relationship is weaker when considering primary earner incomes in dual-earner couples, though.
Controlling for more heterogeneity in the data, estimation results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 confirm the
descriptive evidence: The tables present coefficient estimates for log earnings for singles as well as
for primary earners in couples, Table 3.8 for males and 3.9 for females. When pooling single-earner
and dual-earner couples together selection on the primary earner’s log annual income is positive for
males and females, but becomes weaker for dual-earner couples only. Furthermore, specification 1
in both tables shows that the estimated marginal effects of log income on return propensities of
single males and females who work more than 60% are very similar to those for primary earners in
couples. Figure 3.2 did not provide strong evidence for different selection patterns according to pri-
mary earner’s income for couples with children. The size of the coefficient estimates indicates that
for couples with children positive selection into return migration on primary earner’s income seems
to become weaker. This holds for all couples as well as for dual-earner couples separately. The
estimates for female primary earners in dual-earner couples are statistically insignificant, though.
Table 3.10 presents estimation results for all couples, separately for male and female primary earn-
ers and by return country group. The regressions are estimated pooling couples with and without
children. As above the specifications include a regressor for log annual earnings of the primary
earner. Additionally, an interaction term between primary earner’s log annual earnings and the
presence of children in the household accounts for potential heterogeneity in the selection patterns
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Singles All couples Dual-earner couples
With With
All All children All children
Children <16 in HH -0.0117*** -0.00946*** - -0.0167*** -
(0.00303) (0.00158) (0.00240)
Prim.earner log annual inc. 0.0232*** 0.0331*** 0.0305*** 0.0185*** 0.0110***
(0.00140) (0.00143) (0.00156) (0.00322) (0.00340)
Sec.earner log annual inc. -0.00281 -0.00559
(0.00338) (0.00345)
Partner out of labor force 0.0156*** 0.0166***
(0.00145) (0.00149)
Yrs since imm. female -0.000581*** -0.00150*** -0.00110*** -0.000979***
(0.000155) (0.000151) (0.000272) (0.000287)
Yrs since imm. male -0.00320*** -0.00186*** -0.000752*** -0.00153*** -0.001178***
(0.000100) (0.000144) (0.000166) (0.000259) (0.000267)
Dummy variables:
Female age at imm. - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,530 46,897 35,664 13,259 9,158
R-squared 0.022 0.045 0.040 0.040 0.030
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.8: Linear probability regressions: Earnings and return migration, all countries, male singles
and primary earners.
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Singles All couples Dual-earner couples
With With
All All children All children
Children <16 in HH -0.0176*** -0.0180*** - -0.0241*** -
(0.00129) (0.00249) (0.00384)
Prim.earner log annual inc. 0.0118*** 0.0159*** 0.00897*** 0.0114 0.00692
(0.00143) (0.00269) (0.00272) (0.00714) (0.00606)
Sec.earner log annual inc. 0.00296 0.00175
(0.00637) (0.00520)
Partner out of labor force 0.0216*** 0.0231***
(0.00325) (0.00334)
Yrs since imm. female -0.00262*** -0.00169*** -0.000798*** -0.000922** -0.000483
(0.0000917) (0.000263) (0.000235) (0.000431) (0.000338)
Yrs since imm. male -0.00105*** -0.000776*** -0.00163*** -0.00109***
(0.000234) (0.000275) (0.000398) (0.000341)
Dummy variables:
Female age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male age at imm. - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 49,602 12,005 8,036 3,768 2,482
R-squared 0.021 0.044 0.027 0.063 0.050
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.9: Linear probability regressions: Earnings and return migration, all countries, female
singles and primary earners.
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on income for couples with and without children. For all country groups the selection on primary
earner’s income for couples without children, the reference group, is estimated with a positive
coefficient sign. The positive selection on primary earner’s income for couples without children is
statistically significant for male and female primary earners from the non-Western countries, for
female primary earners from the Nordic countries and for male primary earners from the other
Western countries. The coefficient estimate for the interaction is negative for all country groups,
indicating weaker self-selection on primary earner’s income in the presence of children. The esti-
mates are statistically insignificant for the other Nordic and the other Western countries. Weaker
self-selection in log earnings of male as well as female primary earner in the presence of children
is statistically significant at the 1% level only for the non-Western countries.
Nordic countries Other Western Non-Western
countries countries
Female Male Female Male Female Male
primary primary primary primary primary primary
earner earner earner earner earner earner
Children <16 in HH -0.0324 -0.0148 -0.0254** -0.0147** -0.0209*** -0.0107***
(0.0327) (0.0157) (0.0107) (0.00652) (0.00257) (0.00165)
Prim.earner log ann.inc. 0.0944** 0.0258 0.00848 0.0326*** 0.0119*** 0.0297***
(0.0441) (0.0171) (0.0125) (0.00755) (0.00332) (0.00241)
Log annual inc.*children -0.000645 -0.0259 -0.0114 -0.00534 -0.0179*** -0.0112***
(0.0794) (0.0213) (0.0166) (0.0100) (0.00542) (0.00300)
Yrs since imm. female -0.0158** -0.00421 -0.00290* -0.00331*** -0.000559*** -0.000451***
(0.00653) (0.00297) (0.00158) (0.00104) (0.000159) (0.000104)
Yrs since imm. male 0.00584 -0.00619** -0.00236 -0.00246** -0.000410*** -0.000881***
(0.00632) (0.00297) (0.00154) (0.000999) (0.000139) (9.96e-05)
Dummy variables:
Female age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male age at imm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 2,459 1,520 6,438 9,835 38,000
R-squared 0.288 0.103 0.082 0.057 0.030 0.032
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.10: Linear probability regressions: Earnings, children and return migration.
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In line with descriptive evidence, regression analysis revealed that those with higher earnings are
more likely to return from Denmark. This holds for singles as well as primary earners in couples
and confirms theoretical predictions by Borjas and Bratsbers (1996). It goes against an alternative
hypothesis that immigrants with low earnings return because of having a bad job realization. Both
partners in a couple are attached to the labor force seems to weaken self-selection on the primary
earner’s income. The presence of children also seems to weaken self-selection patterns. Theory and
former empirical evidence on the self-selection of outmigration of emigrants (Borjas and Bratsberg,
1996) suggest that return migration accentuates the selection of the initial migration flow. The
presented findings for primary earners in couples are in line with these previous results and the-
oretical arguments. Moreover, results for return migration of couples from Denmark suggest that
self-selection on primary earner’s income is weaker in couples where both partners are attached to
the labor market. An explanation for these findings might be that potential co-location problems
for couples weaken self-selection due to the partners’ conflicting interests and the challenge to
coordinate on an optimal joint return migration decision. The analysis has also addressed the role
of children in return migration decisions. The presence of children also seems to reduce positive
self-selection on primary earner’s income. The presented results are driven by immigrant couples
from the non-Western origin countries. In the presence of children other factors might be impor-
tant for families returning with children which could weaken selection patterns on parents labor
market characteristics. E.g. results in the first subsection revealed that schooling considerations
might be relevant when it comes to return migration decisions of immigrant families from Denmark.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the role of family ties for return migration of migrant couples. Using us-
ing Danish administrative data from 1981 to 2005 different considerations have been studied which
might affect return migration in the family context. Restricting attention to couples in which both
partners have immigrated from the same country of origin, living together in Denmark, returning
is defined as partners jointly emigrating in the same year to their country of origin according to
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the official migration register. Return propensities vary considerably depending to the country
of origin. Both couples and single migrants are most likely to return when coming from another
Nordic country. Return propensities are lower for those from other Western countries and lowest
for migrants from non-Western countries.
The presence of children in the household plays a role for the return decision of migrant cou-
ples. Having children is associated with lower return propensities, which is statistically significant
for the non-Western countries. Regression analysis reveals that return migration to non-Western
countries is more likely among families with a higher share of daughters. This effect is driven by
Turkish immigrant couples. Identifying a causal link more clearly and disentangling endogenous
return migration from fertility decisions, it can be shown that there is a significantly different effect
of having a girl compared to a boy as the first child in the family for the subsample of Turkish
immigrant couples.
From a policy perspective it is of interest though, through which channels the presence of children
affects return decisions of families: A possible factor that might play a role here could be school-
ing considerations. Altruistic parents might evaluate differences in labor market and schooling
prospects between the host and the home country. Then, return propensities should be higher
for couples with children at an age where these considerations can be expected to be most rele-
vant. In line with Tiebout sorting, return propensities could be expected to be positively related
to schooling quality in the return countries. This can be confirmed with the data: Couples are
significantly more likely to return if their child is below school age. Moreover, results suggest that
return migration probabilities for couples with young children are higher to countries with higher
average PISA test scores. However, as an explanatory variable, GDP per capita in the country
of origin has a larger explanatory power for relatively higher return propensities of couples with
children.
Another potentially important argument playing a role for return decisions for families could be
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preferences related to cultural background. If parents want their children to grow up in the home
country instead of abroad because of considerations related to cultural identity, this can as well
influence return decisions. The differential effect of having a boy or a girl provides some support
for this channel. Return propensities of couples with daughters are particularly high for Turkish
immigrants while labor market perspectives for women can be expected to be better in the egali-
tarian Nordic countries. Another argument in favor of cultural reasons for return migration is the
response of return rates among immigrant couples with children from non-Western countries to a
tightening of family reunification laws in Denmark in 2002.
This chapter has also investigated how family ties and the presence of children are associated with
the selection into return migration on partners’ labor market income. Analyzing earnings and
return migration of couples in which the primary earner works more than 60% in the labor market
revealed that those couples returning are positively selected on the income of the primary earner.
In line with theory, selection patterns to non-Western countries with mostly more dispersed income
distributions are stronger than for the Nordic or Western return countries. Analysis reveals that
positive selection on primary earner’s income is less strong in couples in which both partners are
closely attached to the labor market. These findings hold for male as well as female primary earn-
ers. When analyzing country groups separately, statistically significant results are only obtained
for immigrant couples from the non-Western origin countries. Results suggest that among couples
with children, selection on primary earner’s income is weaker, too. Again this is statistically signif-
icant only for immigrant couples from the non-Western countries. The findings can be explained
by the argument that if the secondary earner’s labor market attachment or considerations related
to children play an important role in the couple’s return migration decision, the selection according
to labor market characteristics of the primary earner might drive return migration to a lesser extent.
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Appendix A
International Family Migration and the
Dual-Earner Model
Household utility maximization in the model
Consider the utility function presented in section 2 with 0 ≤ Ha ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Hb ≤ 1, 0 ≤ D̄ ≤ 1,
wa > 0, wb > 0 and PD > 0.
There are two possibilities for an interior solution of the utility maximization problem in the gender
neutral model when wa > wb (in case wa<wb we can just exchange indices):
Either Ha = H∗a , Hb = 1 (given that 0 < H∗a < 1) or Ha = 0, Hb = H∗b (given that 0 < H∗b < 1) are
feasible interior solutions. Full specialization is only optimal if no interior solution exists because
H∗a < 0 and H∗b > 1. We show formally that full specialization of the partners never yields highest
utility if a feasible interior solution exists.
We show that 1. U(H∗a , Hb = 1) ≥ U(Ha = 0, Hb = 1) and 2. U(Ha = 0, H∗b ) ≥ U(Ha = 0,
Hb = 1).
1. U(H∗a , Hb = 1) ≥ U(Ha = 0, Hb = 1)
• If wb < PD
⇒ ((2− D̄)αwa)α((2− D̄)(1− α))1−α ≥ wαa (1− D̄)1−α
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⇔ ((2− D̄)α)α((2− D̄
1− D̄
)(1− α))1−α ≥ 1
which is strictly greater for all α 6= 12−D̄ .
In general, one can show that for any 0 < α < 1, k ≥ 1 an expression of the form
(kα)α( k
k − 1(1− α))
1−α
obtains its minimum value at (kα)α( k
k−1(1−α))
1−α = 1 with α = 1
k
. We can apply this
insight to the above and following inequalities.
• If wb ≥ PD
⇒ (α(2wa − pDD̄)α((2−
pD
wa
D̄)(1− α))1−α ≥ (wa − pDD̄)α
⇔ (α2wa − pDD̄
wa − pDD̄
)α((2− pD
wa
D̄)(1− α))1−α ≥ 1
which is strictly greater for all α 6= wa−pDD̄2wa−pDD̄ .
2. U(Ha = 0, H∗b ) ≥ U(Ha = 0, Hb = 1)
• If wb < PD
⇒ (α(wa + wb − D̄wb))α((1− α)(
wa
wb
+ 1− D̄))1−α ≥ wαa (1− D̄)1−α
⇔ (αwa + wb − D̄wb
wa
)α((1− α)
wa
wb
+ 1− D̄
1− D̄
)1−α ≥ 1
which is strictly greater for all α 6= wa
wa+wb−wbD̄
.
• If wb ≥ PD
⇒ (α(wa + wb − pDD̄))α(
1
wb
(wa + wb − pDD̄)(1− α))1−α ≥ (wa − pDD̄)α
⇔ (αwa + wb − pDD̄
wa − pDD̄
)α( 1
wb
(wa + wb − pDD̄)(1− α))1−α ≥ 1
which is strictly greater for all α 6= wa−pDD̄
wa+wb−pDD̄
.
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Model solution for wa < wb and λ >> 0
If wa < wb and wawa+wb < α <
1
2 full specialization is never optimal. Either Ha = H
∗
a , Hb = 1 or
Ha = 0, Hb = H∗b are feasible solutions. The optimal division of labor and the threshold above
which b participates in the labor market is now:
In case wb < pD

H∗1a = 1− 2α + αD̄,H∗1b = 1 if α <
ln( wa+wb−wbD̄(2−D̄)wb
)
ln( wa
wb
)
H∗1a = 0, H∗1b = (1− α)
(
wa
wb
+ 1
)
+ αD̄ if
ln( wa+wb−wbD̄(2−D̄)wb
)
ln( wa
wb
) < α
In case wb ≥ pD

H∗2a = 1− 2α− (1− α)pDwa D̄,H
∗2
b = 1 if α <
ln( w
2
a+wawb−wapDD̄
2wawb−wbpDD̄
)
ln( wa
wb
)
H∗2a = 0, H∗2b = (1− α)
(
wa
wb
+ 1− pD
wb
D̄
)
if
ln( w
2
a+wawb−wapDD̄
2wawb−wbpDD̄
)
ln( wa
wb
) < α
Differentiating the threshold value for labor market participation with respect to wa, wb and D̄
yields similar results as for the case wa > wb described in section 2.
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Female respondents
Equal Stronger Stronger Female Male
preferences male female disagreement disagreement
preference preference
Equal pref. 29 6
Stronger male 3 13 1
preference
Male Stronger female 1 7
respondents preference
Female disagr.
Male disagr.
Source: Survey data.
Table A1. Migration preferences of couples with both partners as survey respondents.
Male in the Female in the
Both in the labor force, labor force, At least one partner
labor force female home male home retiree or student
In Denmark
United Kingdom 80.9 2.9 0.0 16.2
Other Western Europe 84.9 3.0 0.0 12.1
AUS, CAN, NZ 89.7 0.0 0.0 10.3
Abroad, in 2008
United Kingdom 67.6 27.9 0.0 4.4
Other Western Europe 66.3 27.7 1.2 4.8
AUS, CAN, NZ 75.9 20.7 0.0 3.5
Source: Survey and register data
Table A2a. Percentage shares for actual labor force participation in other Western countries
(without Nordic countries and the US).
Male in the Female in the
Both in the labor force, labor force, Both
labor force female home male home at home No answer
United Kingdom 57.4 35.3 0.0 1.5 5.9
Other Western Europe 62.7 27.1 0.6 2.4 7.2
AUS, CAN, NZ 75.9 17.1 3.5 3.5 0.0
Source: Survey data
Table A2b. Percentage shares for preferred labor force participation in other Western countries
(without Nordic countries and the US).
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Male preferences
Both Female stays Male stays Both stay No
work at home at home at home answer
Both work 30 5 3
Female Female stays at home 7 7 2
preferences Male stays at home 1
Both stay at home
No answer 5
Source: Survey data.
Table A3: Respondents’ answers towards labor market participation preferences for couples in
which both partners answerd the survey.
A: All couples. Other AUS,
UK Western Europe CAN, NZ
Male tied mover 100.0% 92.0% 100.0%
(5) (25) (6)
No tied mover 82.4% 74.2% 71.4%
(17) (31) (14)
Female tied mover 65.2% 64.5% 77.8%
(46) (110) (9)
B: Couples without
pre-school age children.
Male tied mover 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(4) (16) (5)
No tied mover 100.0% 80.7% 90.0%
(10) (26) (10)
Female tied mover 69.0% 64.2% 83.3%
(29) (81) (6)
Source: Survey data
Notes: Numbers of observation in parentheses.
Table A4. Female labor force participation and tied mover status among emigrant couples in other
Western countries (without other Nordic countries and the US) in 2008.
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Household economy before emigration Emigration 1987-1998 Emigration 2001, 2002
Separate economies 12.6 12.8
Joint economies, the man brings in more money 63.1 63.0
Joint economies, the woman brings in more money 8.1 7.2
Joint economies, both partners bring in the same amount 12.2 12.8
Man brings in all money, woman stays home 2.2 4.0
Woman brings in all money, man stays home 0.4 0.4
No answer 1.5 0.0
Household economy in 2008
Separate economies 1.5 3.6
Joint economies, the man brings in more money 56.1 48.2
Joint economies, the woman brings in more money 10.0 10.8
Joint economies, both partners bring in the same amount 9.2 8.4
Man brings in all money, woman stays home 21.0 27.9
Woman brings in all money, man stays home 1.1 1.2
No answer 1.1 0.0
Total observations 271 251
Source: Survey data
Table A5. Percentage shares of household economies before migration and 2008 by year of emi-
gration.
1987/1988 1992/1993 1997/1998 2001/2002
Nordic countries 23.3 14.5 14.5 26.3
United Kingdom 2.3 11.6 12.6 15.5
Rest of Western Europe 37.2 44.9 34.6 25.5
US 18.7 16.0 20.1 13.2
Other Western countries 9.3 4.3 4.4 6.0
Non-Western countries 9.3 8.7 13.9 13.5
Observations 43 69 159 251
Source: Survey data
Table A6. Percentage shares of countries of residence by emigration years.
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Low Female Male
power power power Power
A: Household economy before emigration couples couples couples couples
Separate economies 11.6 15.1 9.9 13.5
Joint economies, the man brings in more money 59.3 56.6 74.3 61.4
Joint economies, the woman brings in more money 8.1 17.0 4.0 7.1
Joint economies, equal contributions 11.6 7.6 8.9 14.9
Man brings in all money, woman stays home 7.0 1.9 2.0 2.5
Woman brings in all money, man stays home 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
No answer 2.3 1.9 1.0 0.0
B: Household economy in 2008
Separate economies 2.3 1.9 1.0 3.2
Joint economies, the man brings in more money 43.0 49.1 54.5 55.0
Joint economies, the woman brings in more money 19.8 17.0 3.0 8.9
Joint economies, equal contributions 10.5 11.3 3.0 9.9
Man brings in all money, woman stays home 20.9 15.1 36.6 22.7
Woman brings in all money, man stays home 2.3 5.7 0.0 0.4
No answer 1.2 0.0 2.0 0.0
Observations 86 53 101 282
Source: Survey data
Table A7. Percentage shares of household economies before migration and in 2008, by power type.
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No child No child Children Children
in DK, in DK, in DK, in DK,
no child children no child children
A: Household economy before emigration in 2008 in 2008 2008 in 2008
Separate economies 18.4 25.5 3.7 3.6
Joint economies, man brings in more money 51.7 48.4 63.0 76.1
Joint economies, woman brings in more money 11.5 11.5 0.0 4.8
Joint economies, equal contributions 12.6 12.7 25.9 10.8
Man brings in all money, woman stays home 4.6 0.0 3.7 4.4
Woman brings in all money, man stays home 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4
No answer 1.2 1.3 3.7 0.0
B: Household economy in 2008
Separate economies 8.1 1.9 3.7 0.8
Joint economies, man brings in more money 33.3 52.2 40.7 60.2
Joint economies, woman brings in more money 20.7 10.2 7.4 7.2
Joint economies, equal contributions 18.4 7.6 29.6 4.0
Man brings in all money, woman stays home 16.1 26.1 14.8 27.1
Woman brings in all money, man stays home 3.5 0.6 0.0 0.8
No answer 0.0 1.3 3.7 0.0
Observations 87 157 27 251
Source: Survey data
Table A8. Percentage shares of household economies before migration and in 2008, by children in
the household.
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Preference for Actual
female labor force female labor force
participation participation
Power couple 0.0502 -0.0281
(0.0620) (0.0533)
Female power couple -0.0273 0.0238
(0.0865) (0.0684)
Male power couple -0.131 -0.167**
(0.0834) (0.0748)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.409 -0.930***
(0.252) (0.185)
Youngest child 7+ -0.196*** -0.128***
(0.0526) (0.0468)
GINI -2.150*** -1.754***
(0.578) (0.485)
Starting Well Index 0.251 0.899***
(0.309) (0.223)
Constant 1.541*** 1.464***
(0.180) (0.147)
R-squared 0.138 0.176
Observations 393 423
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
FLFP rate according to estimates by International Labour Organization for 2008.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A9. Linear probability regressions: Actual and preferred female labor force participation
and "Starting Well" Index.
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple -0.0144 0.0138 -0.00836 -0.110 -0.00190 0.235
(0.0533) (0.0502) (0.0199) (0.199) (0.0772) (0.0667)
Female power couple 0.0462 0.00783 0.0428 -0.0327 -0.0396 0.290
(0.0694) (0.0649) (0.0385) (0.272) (0.113) (0.193)
Male power couple -0.213*** -0.162** -0.359** -0.0780 -0.178* -0.0527
(0.0686) (0.0683) (0.177) (0.196) (0.0997) (0.0789)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.258*** -0.235** -0.0511 -0.312* -0.187*** -0.465**
(0.0498) (0.0495) (0.0312) (0.101) (0.0509) (0.0650)
Youngest child 7+ -0.123*** -0.0959** -0.0345 -0.175 -0.115*** -0.0147
(0.0445) (0.0437) (0.0414) (0.167) (0.0442) (0.0556)
Female worked in DK 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.655** 0.127 0.526*** -0.152
(0.129) (0.129) (0.265) (0.287) (0.144) (0.248)
Nordic countries 0.215***
(0.0347)
United States -0.174**
(0.0613)
Non-Western countries -0.154**
(0.0666)
Constant 0.533*** 0.511*** 0.363 0.689** 0.402** 0.766***
(0.131) (0.138) (0.258) (0.321) (0.183) (0.276)
R-squared 0.098 0.172 0.392 0.077 0.112 0.208
Observations 505 505 105 81 255 64
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A10. Linear probability regressions: Female labor force participation abroad in 2008.
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple 0.0625** 0.0639** 0.000845 0.134 0.0930* 0.0520
(0 0309) (0.0322) (0.0589) (0.133) (0.0515) (0.0551)
Female power couple 0.0523 0.0558 -0.0200 0.113 0.100** 0.0806
(0.0358) (0.0351) (0 0720) (0.121) (0.0484) (0.0703)
Male power couple 0.0356 0.0341 -0 0463 0 0212 0.0929 -0.00494
(0.0386) (0.0396) (0 120) (0138) (0.0570) (0.0813)
Youngest child in DK 0-6 -0 0466** -0.0455** -0.0912* -0.0855* -0.0395 0.0722
(0 0194) (0.0188) (0.0484) (0.0438) (0.0248) (0.0515)
Youngest child in DK 7+ -0.0332 -0.0316 -0.202 0.0752 -0.0506 0.0809
(0.0380) (0.0391) (0.189) (0.0577) (0.0507) (0.0590)
Nordic countries -0.0227
(0.0264)
United States -0.0219
(0.0275)
Non-Western countries 0.00539
(0.0266)
Constant 0.941*** 0.947*** 1.006*** 0.890*** 0.914*** 0.907***
(0.0270) (0.0306) (0.0418) (0.125) (0.0429) (0.0761)
R-squared 0.032 0.029 0.071 0.105 0.054 0.063
Observations 468 468 95 76 238 59
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A11. Linear probability regressions: Female labor force participation in Denmark.
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Nordic countries US Non-Western countries
Power couple -0.328 0.503 -1.138***
0.322 0.420 0.367
Female power couple 0.395 0.108 -0.599
0.419 0.632 0.537
Male power couple -1.174*** 0.552 -0.263
0.452 0.473 0.396
Youngest child in DK 0-6 0.171 0.262 -0.0665
0.265 0.285 0.324
Youngest child in DK 7+ -0.213 0.895** -0.39
0.507 0.433 0.592
Mother out of labor force at resp. age 12 -0.299 -0.343 -0.184
0.268 0.298 0.326
Constant -0.463 -1.752*** -0.641**
(0.302) (0.393) (0.322)
Observations 522 522 522
Notes: Multinomial logit estimation. Reference category: Other Western countries.
Coefficient estimates reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A12. Sorting into different countries of residence conditional on observable characteristics.
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Emigration Emigration
87/88, 92/93, 97/98 01/02
Preference for Actual Preference for Actual
female labor force female labor force female labor force female labor force
participation participation participation participation
Power couple 0.0666 0.0149 0.1178 0.0182
(0.0848) (0.0793) (0.0777) (0.0694)
Female power couple -0.0713 -0.0120 0.0381 0.0761
(0.1274) (0.1049) (0.1011) (0.0822)
Male power couple -0.1515 -0.0985 -0.0885 -0.2258**
(0.1025) (0.0954) (0.1105) (0.1017)
Youngest child 0-6 -0.3165*** -0.2946*** -0.1757*** -0.1919***
(0.0839) (0.0813) (0.0646) (0.0627)
Youngest child 7+ -0.2173*** -0.1826*** -0.2079*** -0.0208
(0.0646) (0.0596) (0.0768) (0.0698)
Nordic countries 0.2705*** 0.1894*** 0.2000*** 0.2377***
(0.0576) (0.0546) (0.0667) (0.0999)
United States -0.1822*** -0.1975** -0.1937* -0.1628
(0.0812) (0.0804) (0.1063) (0.0551)
Non-Western countries -0.0080 -0.1237 0.0492 -0.1742*
(0.0971) (0.0921) (0.0967) (0.0951)
Constant 0.9157*** 0.9161*** 0.7511*** 0.7905***
(0.0838) (0.0759) 0.0850) 0.0753)
R-squared 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.20
Observations 238 259 229 246
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A13. Preferred and actual female labor force participation separately for earlier and later
emigration cohorts.
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple 0.103* 0.0917* 0.0945 0.101 0.163** 0.054
(0.0560) (0.0523) (0.133) (0.117) (0.0813) (0.0852)
Female power couple 0.0327 0.0399 0.0766 0.0234 0.114 -0.189
(0.0817) (0.0782) (0.153) (0.190) (0.122) (0.217)
Male power couple 0.203*** 0.183*** 0.328** 0.156 0.250*** 0.0993
(0.0580) (0.0528) (0.164) (0.124) (0.0836) (0.0771)
Youngest child 0-6 0.293*** 0.283*** 0.265** 0.378*** 0.315*** 0.0598
(0.0549) (0.0512) (0.109) (0.123) (0.0808) (0.0931)
Youngest child 7+ 0.284*** 0.261*** 0.266** 0.255** 0.304*** 0.100
(0.0527) (0.0496) (0.123) (0.121) (0.0759) (0.0914)
Male contributed 0.191*** 0.201*** 0.328*** 0.183* 0.146** 0.136
more in DK (0.0428) (0.0398) (0.103) (0.0965) (0.0567) (0.1146)
GINI 1.713***
(0.328)
Nordic countries -0.208***
(0.0513)
United States 0.0757**
(0.0364)
Non-Western countries 0.114***
(0.0418)
Constant 0.225* 0.354*** 0.0546 0.413*** 0.297*** 0.724***
(0.118) (0.0648) (0.140) (0.180) (0.0891) (0.152)
R-squared 0.238 0.260 0.194 0.269 0.193 0.18
Observations 477 519 109 84 260 66
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A14. Linear probability regressions: Male partner contributes more to joint household
economy in 2008.
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Nordic Other West. Non-Western
All countries countries US countries countries
Power couple 0.0857 0.0825 -0.0311 -0.0199 0.170* 0.0979
(0.0697) (0.0656) (0.141) (0.193) (0.0995) (0.158)
Female power couple 0.0287 0.0456 0.00981 -0.0704 0.0809 -0.0551
(0.0963) (0.0921) (0.167) (0.266) (0.143) (0.292)
Male power couple 0.224*** 0.213*** 0.325** 0.180 0.248** 0.194
(0.0744) (0.0689) (0.147) (0.190) (0.105) (0.144)
Youngest child 0-6 0.299*** 0.291*** 0.203* 0.640*** 0.311*** 0.0629
(0.0666) (0.0633) (0.112) (0.208) (0.101) (0.150)
Youngest child 7+ 0.325*** 0.297*** 0.229* 0.385** 0.377*** 0.125
(0.0633) (0.0609) (0.129) (0.177) (0.0910) (0.152)
Male contributed 0.200*** 0.213*** 0.299*** 0.294** 0.124* 0.213
more in DK (0.0527) (0.0498) (0.108) (0.146) (0.0724) (0.187)
GINI 1.396***
(0.420)
Nordic destination -0.161***
(0.0576)
US destination 0.0619
(0.0548)
Non-Western dest. 0.125**
(0.0557)
Constant 0.178 0.287*** 0.146 0.203 0.231* 0.567**
(0.140) (0.0741) (0.150) (0.197) (0.0972) (0.236)
R-squared 0.227 0.248 0.181 0.413 0.218 0.187
Observations 351 379 99 47 193 40
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sample: Both partners work abroad
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A15. Linear probability regressions: Male partner contributes more to joint household
economy in 2008 among dual-earner couples.
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Appendix B
Family Decision-Making on
International Migration
Analysis of corner solutions
For our analysis we required that
x̄wb − c− h > 0 (B.1)
x̄wa − c− h > 0 (B.2)
x <
2c− x̄wa
wb
or x < c− h
wb
(B.3)
B.1 is the most restrictive assumption if we assume that wa ≤ wb and that migration costs are the
same for a and b. (B.3) requires that wage differences between a and b are sufficiently small. It
becomes binding only if x > c−h
wb
. In the following we will relax the three assumptions and go then
through our comparative statics for migration probabilities.
Relaxing Assumption (B.1)
If x̄wb − c− h < 0 but (B.2) and (B.3) hold this changes P3:
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P3 =
c
wa∫
2c−x̄wb
wa

x̄∫
2c−xawa
wb
1
x̄− x
dxb
 dxa =
c
wa∫
2c−x̄wb
wa
(
x̄− 2c− xawa
wb
)
dxa =
1
2
(x̄wb − c)2
wawb
∂ P3
P4
∂wa
< 0,
∂ P3
P4
∂wb
> 0,
∂ P3
P4
∂h
< 0.
Relaxing Assumption (B.1) and (B.2)
Keeping (B.3) and having x̄wa − c− h < 0 also changes P2:
P2 =
c
wb∫
2c−x̄wa
wb

x̄∫
2c−xbwb
wa
1
x̄− x
dxa
 dxb =
c
wb∫
2c−x̄wa
wb
(
x̄− 2c− xbwb
wa
)
dxb =
1
2
(x̄wa − c)2
wawb
P4 = P1 + P2 + P3 =
1
2(x̄wa − c)
2 + 12(x̄wb − c)
2 + (x̄wa − c)(x̄wb − c)
wawb
=
1
2(x̄wa + x̄wb − 2c)
2
wawb
∂ P2
P4
∂wa
> 0,
∂ P2
P4
∂wb
< 0,
∂ P2
P4
∂h
= 0.
∂ P3
P4
∂wa
< 0,
∂ P3
P4
∂wb
> 0,
∂ P3
P4
∂h
= 0.
If (B.1) and (B.2) do not hold, the joint migration probability P4 is the same as in a model where
both partners maximize joint household income and never split up. In this case wage differences
are small ((B.3) holds).
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Illustration for probabilities when relaxing Assumption (B.1).
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Illustration for probabilities when relaxing Assumptions (B.1) and (B.2).
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Relaxing Assumption (B.3), and therefore (B.1)
If wage differences between a and b are relatively large we have 2c−x̄wa
wb
< x. If additionally x > c−h
wb
,
this changes P2 once more to:
P2 =
c
wb∫
x̄−1

x̄∫
2c−xbwb
wa
1
x̄− x
dxa
 dxb =
c
wb∫
x̄−1
(
x̄− 2c− xbwb
wa
)
dxb
= x̄− x̄2 +
−12(x̄− 1)
2w2b + 2wbc(x̄− 1) + x̄wac− 32c
2
wawb
P4 = x̄− x̄2 +
−12(x̄− 1)
2w2b + 2wbc(x̄− 1) + x̄wac− 32c
2
wawb
+
1
2(x̄wb − c)
2
wawb
+ (x̄wa − c)(x̄wb − c)
wawb
= x̄− 2c
wa
+ x̄wb
wa
− wb2wa
P2
P4
=
wawb(x̄− x̄2)− 12(x̄− 1)
2w2b + 2wbc(x̄− 1) + x̄wac− 32c
2
(x̄− x̄2)wawb − 12(x̄− 1)2w2b + 2wbc(x̄− 1) + x̄wac−
3
2c
2 + 12(x̄wb − c)2 + (x̄wa − c)(x̄wb − c)
P3
P4
=
1
2(x̄wb − c)
2
(x̄− x̄2)wawb − 12(x̄− 1)2w2b + 2wbc(x̄− 1) + x̄wac−
3
2c
2 + 12(x̄wb − c)2 + (x̄wa − c)(x̄wb − c)
∂ P2
P4
∂wa
> 0,
∂ P2
P4
∂wb
< 0,
∂ P2
P4
∂h
= 0.
∂ P3
P4
∂wa
< 0 ,
∂ P3
P4
∂wb
> 0 ,
∂ P3
P4
∂h
= 0.
If (B.1) and (B.3) do not hold, the joint migration probability P4 is the same as in a model where
both partners maximize joint household income and never split up. In this case wage differences
are large.
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Illustration for probabilities when relaxing Assumption (B.3).
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Female respondents
Equal Stronger Stronger Female Male
preferences male female disagreement disagreement
preference preference
Equal pref. 27 6 1
Stronger male 2 13 2
preference
Male Stronger female 2 7
respondents preference
Female disagr.
Male disagr.
Source: Survey data.
Table B1. Migration preferences of couples with both partners as survey respondents
(1) (2) (3)
Log household income -0.171*** -0.160*** -0.170***
(0.0500) (0.0500) (0.0500)
Log income difference 0.120*** 0.0969** 0.0862**
primary - secondary earner (0.0410) (0.0432) (0.0434)
Child in DK 0-6 0.0374 0.0147
(0.0354) (0.0374)
Child in DK 7+ 0.184** 0.152*
(0.0840) (0.0855)
Cohabiting 5+ years in DK 0.0656*
(0.0370)
Observations 201 201 201
R-squared 0.070 0.095 0.110
Notes: OLS estimation. Constant included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table B2. Linear probability regressions: Stronger male preferences towards joint emigration,
male primary earner couples. Alternative specification with log household income and log income
differences between primary and secondary earner.
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Appendix C
Family Return Migration
All Nordic Other Remaining
countries countries Western countries Turkey
Oldest child born in DK -0.0164*** -0.0665** -0.0136* -0.00992*** -0.00541***
(0.0013) (0.0259) (0.00736) (0.00100) (0.000978)
Oldest child born in DK*girl -0.0012 0.0117 -0.00327 -0.000463 0.00114*
(0.0010) (0.0351) (0.00701) (0.000716) (0.000647)
Oldest child left household -0.0159*** -0.0155 -0.0157** -0.0101*** -0.00448***
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.00664) (0.00102) (0.000952)
Years since migration male -0.0022 -0.0124*** -0.00358*** -0.00119*** -0.000487***
(9.50e-05) (0.000751) (7.50e-05) (0.000101) (8.54e-5)
Years since migration female -0.0008 -0.00806*** -0.00366*** -0.000418*** -0.000129***
(9.34e-05) (0.000812) (7.09e-05) (8.65e-05) (7.77e-05)
Female age at imm. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male age at imm. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107,748 3,242 12,706 91,800 39,244
R-squared 0.041 0.117 0.050 0.025 0.021
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability model estimation. Only couples with children.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on household level. Constant included.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table C1. Linear probability regressions: Family return to origin country. Couples with children.
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Figure C1. Cumulative distribution functions for log-standardized earnings, by country of origin
group.
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Only families w. oldest Only families w. oldest
child born abroad child born in DK
Age oldest child
1 -0.0236 -0.00419
(0.0322) (0.00545)
2 -0.0179 -0.0130**
(0.0318) (0.00512)
3 -0.0408 -0.00506
(0.0316) (0.00544)
4 -0.0510 0.00358
(0.0360) (0.00600)
5 -0.109*** -0.00137
(0.0299) (0.00535)
6 -0.101*** 0.0128*
(0.0300) (0.00767)
7 -0.103*** 0.00188
(0.0299) (0.00621)
8 -0.119*** 0.000265
(0.0293) (0.00589)
9 -0.109*** -0.00266
(0.0297) (0.00501)
10 -0.113*** 0.000645
(0.0296) (0.00504)
11 -0.125*** 0.00166
(0.0293) (0.00507)
12 -0.133*** 0.00992
(0.0290) (0.00969)
13 -0.119*** -0.00256
(0.0296) (0.00557)
14 -0.133*** 0.00805
(0.0291) (0.00893)
15 -0.129*** -0.00215
(0.0292) (0.00551)
16 -0.130*** 0.0137
(0.0293) (0.0119)
Male out of LF 0.0203*** 0.0134***
(0.00581) (0.00371)
Female out of LF 0.0163** 0.00566
(0.00782) (0.00696)
Dummy variables
Yrs since imm. male Yes Yes
Yrs since imm. female Yes Yes
Female age at imm. Yes Yes
Male age at imm. Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Observations 9,246 12,037
R-squared 0.092 0.051
Notes: Coefficients from linear probability model estimation. Only couples with children.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on household level. Constant included.
Table C2. Linear probability regressions: Couples with children. Return according to age of oldest
child.
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